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I. INTRODUCTION 
As United States military and paramilitary involvement in the political affairs of 
Central America escalates, legal commentators continue to question the legality of United 
States intervention in Central America based on violations of recognized principles of 
international law. Essentially, these articles discuss whether U.S. actions in Central Amer-
ica violate United Nations Charter Articles 2(4) and 51, and the Charter of the Orga-
nization of American States. l An examination of the legality of U.S. intervention using 
United States domestic legislation and case law has, however, been ignored. This Note 
will show that the United States military and paramilitary intervention in the affairs of 
El Salvador and Nicaragua is illegal under domestic law, specifically the War Powers 
Resolution, the Foreign Assistance Act, the Neutrality Act, the United States Constitution, 
and the Boland Amendment to the House Appropriations Bill of 1982.2 Accordingly, 
this Note is divided into two principal sections, the first explores the situation in El 
Salvador, the second the situation in Nicaragua. 
1 For studies of the legality of United States intervention in Central America from an inter-
national law perspective, see generally, Rowles, The United States, the OAS and the Dilemma of Undesirable 
Regime, 13 GA. J. INT'L & COMPo L. 385 (1983); Szasz, The Role of the United Nations in Internal 
Conflicts, 13 GA. J. INT'L & COMPo L. 344 (1983); Coercion and Self-Determination: Construing Charter 
Article 2(4), 78 AM. J. OF INT'L L. 642 (1984); Beres, Ignoring International Law: United States Policy 
on Insurgency and Intervention in Central America, 14 DEN. J. INT'L & POL'y 76 (1986); Joyner & 
Grimaldi, The United States and Nicaragua: Reflections on the Lawfulness of Contemporary Intervention, 25 
VA. J. INT'L L. 620 (1985). 
• For good introductory discussions of the current political situations in other Central American 
countries see R. IMMERMAN, THE C.I.A. IN GUATAMALA (1982); Weitz, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency 
in Central America, 101 POL. SCI. Q. 397 (1986); J. BELL, CRISIS IN COSTA RICA (1971); J. FRIED, 
GUATEMALA IN REBELLION: UNFINISHED HISTORY (1983); W. LAFEBER, INEVITABLE REVOLUTION: THE 
UNITED STATES IN CENTRAL AMERICA (1983); T. ANDERSON, POLITICS IN CENTRAL AMERICA (1982); 
R. NYROP, ED., PANAMA: A COUNTRY STUDY (1981); G. EDWARDS & W. BUTLER, GUATEMALA: A NEW 
BEGINNING (1987). 
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The United States presence in Nicaragua is predicated on the belief that the San-
dinista government there is assisting in the training of the rebels in EI Salvador3 that are 
currently fighting against the U.S.-backed government of Jose Napoleon Duarte.4 There-
fore, the U.S. actions in those two countries are inextricably linked and must be explored 
together. For example, former Secretary of State Alexander Haig has claimed that the 
entire EI Salvadoran guerrilla movement was "run from Managua", the capital of Nic-
aragua.s His successor, George Shultz, has been equally outspoken in voicing the view 
that Nicaragua is actively coordinating the Salvadoran rebels. 6 President Reagan has said: 
The Sandinistas have been engaged for some time in spreading their 
Communist revolution beyond their borders. They're providing arms, train-
ing, and a headquarters to the Communist guerrillas who are attempting to 
overthrow the democratically elected Duarte government of EI Salvador.7 
However, the Nicaraguan Government has repeatedly denied that it is involved in 
the training of EI Salvadoran rebels in any way.8 Furthermore, David C. McMichael, a 
former C.I.A. employee who monitored arms traffic in Nicaragua from 1981-83, has 
noted: 
The whole picture that the Administration has presented of Salvadoran 
insurgent operations being planned, directed, and supplied from Nicaragua 
3 President Reagan has repeatedly voiced his belief that covert aid to the contras in Nicaragua 
would be used to help stop the flow from the Nicaraguan government to the rebels in El Salvador. 
See T. BERRY & D. PREUSCH, THE CENTRAL AMERICAN FACT BOOK 277 (1986). See also, Taubman, 
U.S. Said to Expand Central American Intelligence Operations, N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 1983, at A16, col. 
I. 
4 The United States commitment to El Salvador's Duarte regime continues to increase. Support 
for 1987 should be in the $400-S00 million range, about 6S% of which is in direct military aid. 
That sum represents over SO% of El Salvador's total budget for the year. See Spektor, Remember El 
Salvador?, UTNE READER, November 1986, at II. 
s See Brecher, Taking Aim at Nicaragua, NEWSWEEK, March 22, 1982, at 20-22; Statement by 
Alexander Haig, Secretary of State, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Feb. 2, 1982), 
reprinted in 82 DEP'T ST. BULL. 27, 28-29 (1982). 
6 See e.g., Interview with George Schultz, Secretary of State, on "Meet the Press" (Aug. 7, 1983), 
reprinted in 83 DEP'T ST. BULL. 47, 48 (1983). See also Address by George Schultz, Secretary of State, 
to the World Affairs Council (Apr. IS, 1983), reprinted in 83 DEP'T ST. BULL. 10, 12 (1983). 
7 R. Reagan, President Reagan's View of Nicaragua, in P. ROSSET & J. VANDERMEER, NICARAGUA: 
UNFINISHED REVOLUTION II, 13 (1987). 
8 In a case before the International Court of Justice, Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.]. 14 (Merits of Judgment of June 27), 
Miguel D'Escoto Brockmann, the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Nicaragua, stated in his 
Affidavit: 
I am aware of the allegations made by the Government of the United States that 
my Government is sending arms, ammunition, communications equipment and med-
ical supplies to rebels conducting a civil war against the Government of El Salvador. 
Such allegations are false, and constitute nothing more than a pretext for the U.S. to 
continue its unlawful military and paramilitary activities against Nicaragua intended 
to overthrow my Government. In truth, my Government is not engaged, and has not 
been engaged, in the provision of arms or other supplies to either of the factions 
engaged in the civil war in El Salvador. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities 
in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.e.]. 1,4 (Request for the Indication of 
Provisional Measures of May 10) (separately printed dissent of Schwebel, ].), reprinted 
in 23 I.L.M. 468, 480 (1984). 
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is simply not true ... [T]he Administration and the C.I.A. have systematically 
misrepresented Nicaraguan involvement in the supply of arms to the Sal-
vadoran guerrillas to justify its efforts to overthrow the Nicraguan govern-
ment. 9 
225 
This difference of opinion regarding alleged Nicaraguan assistance to EL Salvadoran 
rebels is representative of the controversy surrounding United States involvement in 
these two countries. 1O As a result, this note frequently presents conflicting evidence 
concerning the extent of United States intervention in both El Salvador and Nicaragua. 
Nonetheless, analysis of both domestic law and the evidence of U.S. intervention in El 
Salvador and Nicaragua demonstrates conclusively that this intervention is illegal. 
II. THE HISTORY OF UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT IN EL SALVADOR 
In order to understand the contemporary state of affairs in El Salvador, it is first 
necessary to understand the history of the country and of the United States presence 
there. ll United States military, economic, and political involvement in El Salvador began 
many years ago. 
American involvement in the affairs of El Salvador began in the early twentieth 
century, when the United States replaced England as the principal foreign influence in 
the country, primarily through financial deals arranged by men such as Minor Keith, a 
wealthy American entrepreneur.!2 In 1923, Keith arranged for a long-term loan from 
American banks to the Salvadoran government of over $16.5 million. The terms of the 
loan were novel because they provided that if El Salvador defaulted, the U.S. bankers 
and the State Department would manage the country's international trade through a 
type of receivership.!3 The loans were then principally used to payoff El Salvador's 
debts to Keith.!4 Unfortunately, some of the money also found its way to powerful 
families in El Salvador. These people became the wealthy plantation owners known as 
the "fourteen families."!5 Consequently, the distribution of income became so inequitable 
that an inordinate amount of tension developed between the peasant class and the 
9 N.Y. Times, June 11, 1984, at B6, col. 3. McMichael has also said that much of the evidence 
on which the United States bases its assertion is "unreliable, some of it is suspect, and I believe it 
has been presented in a deliberately misleading fashion on many occasions." See Case Concerning 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), I.C.]. Verbatim Record, 
CR 85/21, at 22 (Sept. 16, 1985). 
10 It is important to note at this point that because the situation in Central America is volatile 
and constantly changing, the best way to document the situation is through newspaper accounts, 
even though "such evidence may be considered hearsay and even contrary to official findings made 
by the Executive Branch and the State Department." See Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp 
351,355-56 n. 4 (N.D. CA. 1982). 
II One commentator has written that "the whole political labyrinth of EI Salvador can be 
explained only in reference to its traumatic history." See T. ANDERSON, MATANZA 159 (1971) 
12 See MARC HEROLD, FROM RICHES TO "RAGS": FINANZKAPITAL IN EL SALVADOR, 1900-1980 
(1980) (unpublished manuscript available in the University of New Hampshire Library). 
13 BERRY & PREUSCH, supra note 3, at 198. 
14 [d. at 199. 
15 The "fourteen families" (catorce grande) included some of EI Salvador's richest citizens. In 
1931, these families, composed of coffee plantation owners, produced 95.5% of the country's export 
earnings. They paid the country's taxes, and financed the construction of roads, ports and railroads. 
Simply put, "they owned the country." D. BROWNING, EL SALVADOR 365 (1975). 
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wealthy.I6 This tension erupted in 1932 in the massacre known as the matanza. The 
political problems that caused the matanza were complex, and must be examined in 
detail. 
By the early 1930's, the Indians indigenous to the western and central areas of El 
Salvador were displaced by government soldiers. As a result, the Indians were forced to 
abandon farming and find jobs picking coffee beans on the large plantations run by the 
"fourteen families." Unfortunately, as coffee prices dropped on the world market due 
to the Great Depression, many Indian workers were fired by the plantation owners. 
Consequently in 1932, the unemployed and displaced Indians staged an uprising against 
the growers in the Izalco area of El Salvador.I7 
Simultaneously, political and social unrest was building in the larger cities of El 
Salvador. Revolutionary leader Augustin Farabundo Marti led a worker's revolt because 
the miltary government had refused to seat members of the Communist Party, despite 
the fact that they had been popularly elected in the January 1932 elections. IS Determined 
to abort a coup attempt, the government captured and executed Marti and also crushed 
the Indian revolt. Subsequently, in order to avoid future unrest, the government mas-
sacred over 30,000 civilians in an event that has come to be known as the matanza. 19 
The legacy of the matanza continues today.20 The chief Salvadoran guerilla army, 
which opposes the U.S.-backed Duarte regime, is known as FMLN, or the Farabundo 
Marti Liberation Front, after the revolutionary leader executed in the uprising.21 Simi-
larly, one of its battalions is named after Jose Feliciano Ama, who led the Indian rebellion 
of 1932.22 The FMLN is not alone in memorializing matanza fighters, as the Salvadoran 
government has also retained vestiges of the massacre. General Maximilano Hernandez 
Martinez, the government leader of the massacre and the country's dictator until 1944, 
lent his name to one of the most notorious of the conservative, government-controlled 
"death squads."23 
16 In fact, the differences between the poor and rich were so pronounced that a United States 
army officer visiting San Salvador in 193 I noted that "there seems to be nothing between the high 
priced cars and the oxcart with its barefoot attendant. There is no middle class. [A few] families 
own nearly everything in the country and live in regal style, the rest of the population has practically 
nothing." See Grieb, The United States and the Rise of General Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez 18 J. 
LAT. AM. STUD. 152 (1971). 
17 BERRY & PREUSCH, supra note 3, at 200. 
IBId. 
19 Estimates of the dead vary. Anderson, in MATANZA, supra note 11, at 159, claims that the 
army did not have enough ammunition to kill more than 10,000 people. Others estimate the number 
of dead at 30,000. Regardless of the number of dead that one accepts, it is universally believed that 
the level of human destruction was vast. Most of the victims were shot in the head, after their 
thumbs had been tied behind their backs, a technique used by the "death squads" today. See T. 
ANDERSON, THE WAR OF THE DISPOSSESSED: HONDURAS AND EL SALVADOR 24 (1981); Chomsky, 
Banana Empire: How America Controls the Caribbean, UTNE READER, February 1987, at 67. 
20 Anderson has stated that the Matanza is yet another part of EI Salvador's history that must 
be understood if one is to sort out the 1980's quagmire. See ANDERSON, supra note 11, at 159-60. 
21 The FMLN is composed of five smaller armies. These are: The Popular Liberation Force 
(FPL), People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), Armed Forces of National Resistance (FARN), Central 
American Revolutionary Worker's Party (PRTC) , and Armed Forces of Liberation (FAL). See 
generally P. RUSSELL, EL SALVADOR IN CRISIS (1984). 
22 This battalion is stationed in the area of Izalco. BERRY & PREUSCH, supra note 3, at 200. 
23 The Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez Brigade first surfaced in the late 1970's. 
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These death squads, organized for the purpose of terrorizing civilians, began in 
1968 as an official organ of the Ministry of Defense known as ORDEN (National Dem-
ocratic Organization). They were set up in part by the C.I.A. and General Jose Alberto 
Medrano. 24 This single original death squad has since splintered into several distinct 
groups, each with varying degrees of governmental support. In addition to the Martinez 
Brigade, these groups include The White Warriors Union, the White Hand, Anti-
Communist Forces for Liberation (Felange), the Organization for the Liberation from 
Communism (OLC), and the Secret Anti-Communist Army (ESA).25 
The activities of the death squads are infamous, and it has been estimated that they 
have murdered several thousand civilians since their inception.26 At one point it was 
estimated that the death squads murdered 300-500 civilians each month.27 On December 
2, 1980, the death squad rape and murder of four United States churchwomen forced 
the U.S. government to take notice of the human rights violations committed by the 
death squads.28 In the wake of those murders, the United States suspended military and 
economic aid to El Salvador, but resumed it one month later.29 
Despite the continued activities of the death squads, American aid has increased 
steadily since its resumption in 1981. In the 1984 Salvadoran general elections, for 
example, the United States spent over $10 million to bring Jose Napoleon Duarte and 
his Christian Democratic Party to power.3D By 1985, the U.S. was providing $1.5 million 
a day to El Salvador in military and econmic aid. 31 Total aid since the 1981 resumption 
is in excess of $2 billion.32 United States aid to El Salvador has become so extensive in 
fact that Alberto Bonilla, president of the Salvadoran Central Bank, noted that without 
the aid his country would have 20% negative economic growth. 33 He has further noted 
that El Salvador needs at least a billion dollars a year from the United States to maintain 
even a "relatively stable economy."34 This aid has today reached the point that the United 
States even pays the salaries of some Salvadoran civil servants.35 
III. THE ILLEGALITY OF UNITED STATES INTERVENTION IN EL SALVADOR 
This section will examine the legality of U.S. intervention in El Salvador under two 
domestic laws, the War Powers Resolution (Resolution), and the Foreign Assistance Act. 
24 See R. ARMSTRONG & P. WHEATON, REFORM AND REPRESSION: U.S. POLICY IN EL SALVADOR 
1950-1981, at 4 (1982). 
25 See generally id. 
26 BERRY & PREUSCH, supra note 3, at 205. 
27 LaFeber, Reagan and Revolution in Central America, in THE PRESIDENT'S WAR POWERS: FROM 
THE FEDERALISTS TO REAGAN 190 (D. Caraley ed. 1986). 
28 BERRY & PREUSCH, supra note 3, at 207. 
29Id. 
30Id. at 208. 
31Id. at 213. 
32 United States military aid was $6 million in 1980, and this grew to $35.5 million in 1981 and 
$82 million in 1982. In addition, economic aid tripled from $58.5 million to $189 million in 1982. 
In fact, the U.S. sent more aid to EI Salvador in 1981 and 1982 than to any other Latin American 
nation. However, that money still did not offset the $1.5 billion of capital that left that country for 
Swiss bank accounts during those years, allegedly through Salvadoran government corruption. 
LaFeber, supra note 27, at 191. 
33 BERRY & PREUSCH, supra note 3, at 213. 
34 LATIN AMERICA REGIONAL REPORTS, 38 (July 13, 1984). 
35 BERRY & PREUSCH, supra note 3, at 214. 
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A. United States Intervention in El Salvador is Illegal Under the War Powers Resolution 
In 1973, Congress passed the War Powers Resolution. 36 The Resolution was intended 
to "prevent secret, unauthorized military support activities and to prevent a repetition 
of many of the most controversial and regrettable actions in Indo-China" in the wake of 
VietnamY Furthermore, it was intended to reaffirm Congressional will to follow the 
"necessary and proper" clause of Article I section 8 of the Constitution.38 
The Resolution has a number of important provisions. First, it requires the President 
to consult with Congress before "introducing United States Armed Forces into hostili-
ties."39 In addition to this "consultation" requirement, the resolution contains a much 
stronger "reporting" requirement. 4o This "reporting" provision requires that, in the 
absence of a declaration of war, in any instance in which United States Armed Forces 
are introduced into hostilities, or in situations where "imminent involvement in hostilities 
is clearly indicated by the circumstances", the President must "submit a written report 
to the Speaker of the House and President pro tempore of the Senate within 48 hours."4l 
Furthermore, the report must set forth three things: the circumstances necessitating the 
inlroduction of troops, the Constitutional and legislative authority under which such 
introduction took place, and finally the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities 
or involvement.42 If the President fails to comply with the reporting requirement, the 
troops must be withdrawn within 60 days.43 This time limitation is waived only if Congress 
has declared war or granted an extension beyond the 60 day limit. 44 
Since President Reagan has failed to notify Congress of the extent of United States 
military and paramilitary support to the Salvadoran government, it seems that the War 
Powers Resolution is applicable to events surrounding United States intervention in El 
Salvador. However, the Reagan Administration argues that the Resolution does not apply 
based on two contentions.45 
36 50 U.S.c. § 1541 et seq., enacted Nov. 7, 1973. For good discussions of the War Powers 
Resolution, and the circumstances surrounding its passage see King & Leavens, Curbing the Dog of 
War: The War Powers Resolution, 18 HARVARD INT'L LJ. 55 (1977); Note, Presidential Power to Make 
War, 7 IND. L. REV. 900 (1974); Franck, After the Fall: The New Presidential Frameworkfor Congressional 
Control Over the War Power, 71 AM. J. INT'L LAW 605 (1977). 
37 S.Rep. No. 220, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 25, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 
2346. 
38 "It is the purpose of this joint resolution to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution 
of the United States and insure the collective judgments of both the Congress and President will 
apply to the introduction of United Stated Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where 
imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued 
use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations." 50 U.S.C. § 1541(a) (1983). "Under Article I, 
section 8, of the Constitution, it is specifically provided that the Congress shall make all laws 
necessary and proper for carrying into execution, not only its own powers but also the other powers 
vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer 
thereof." 50 U.S.c. § 1541(b) (1983). 
39 50 U.S.C. § 1542(1983). 
40 50 U.S.c. § 1543(1983). 
41 50 U.S.C. § 1543(d) (1983). 
42 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a)(I) (1983). 
43 50 U.S.c. § 1544(b) (1983). 
44Id. 
45 Lobel & Ratner, Is U.S. Military Intervention in Central America Legal?, 12 HUMAN RIGHTS 22, 
24 (Fall 1984). 
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First, the Administration contends that as a threshold matter, the Resolution simply 
does not apply to the general situation in Central America, or to El Salvador in partic-
ular.46 Secondly, the Reagan Administration maintains that the troops stationed in El 
Salvador are not "involved in hostilities" or "facing imminent hostilities" as defined by 
the Resolution because the troops are not equipped for combat, do not go on patrol 
with Salvadoran forces, and remain in places of safety in San Salvador, El Salvador's 
capital.47 
There is evidence that the Administration view of the War Powers Resolution is 
flawed. In 1984, eleven years after the original enactment of the Resolution, Congress 
issued a statement entitled Congressional Feelings on the Introduction of the United States 
Armed Forces into Central America.4s Congress found that United States troops should not 
be introduced into the countries of Central America, and furthermore that any such 
introduction would have to comply with all of the terms of the War Powers Resolution.49 
In addition, there are other problems with the Administration's assessment that the 
United States Armed Forces are not engaged in hostilities. First, the narrow interpre-
tation of the Resolution urged by the President is not warranted. Legislative history, for 
example, defines the words "hostilities and imminent hostilities" to include any situation 
where troops could possibly be subject to the hostile acts of enemy troopS.50 Using this 
Congressional definition, U.S. troops in El Salvador are presently involved in "hostilities 
and imminent hostilities." 
United States troops are on occasion engaged in combat and related activities in El 
Salvador. United States soldiers have been observed in the field, dressed and prepared 
for combat. For example, on February 2, 1983 the Administration admitted that an 
American soldier was shot in the leg while accompanying Salvadoran troops in a combat 
helicopter.51 In addition, three U.S. servicemen were found to be "working directly" with 
a Salvadoran unit on a tactical operation. 52 There has also been at least one American 
soldier killed in combat in El Salvador. On March 31, 1987, Salvadoran guerrillas raided 
the army base at El Paraiso, killing 43 Salvadoran soldiers and one American adviser.53 
The American, Sgt. Gregory A. Fronius, was killed by mortar fire in the attack, and was 
the first U.S. military adviser to die in battle in El Salvador.54 
Moreover, American soldiers have also been killed while not in battle in El Salvador. 
On May 25, 1983, Lt. Commander Albert A. Schaufelberger, Deputy Commander of 
the Military Assistance Group in El Salvador, was shot to death.55 In addition, on June 
46Id. 
47/d. 
48 Act of Oct. 12, 1984. Pub. L. No. 98-473, Title 7, Sec 101 (b) in part, 98 Stat. 1942. 
49Id. at (b)( I) and (b)(2). 
50 The word "hostilities" was substituted for the phrase "armed conflict" because it was consid-
ered broader in scope. It includes the danger of armed conflict. "Imminent hostilities" denotes a 
situation in which there is a clear potential either for such a state of armed conflict or actual armed 
conflict. See Lobel & Ratner, supra note 45, at 25. 
51 N.Y. Times, Feb. 20,1983, § 6 (Magazine), at 35. 
52Id. 
53 Aleman, Salvador Raid Kills U.S. Aide, 43 Soldiers, Boston Globe, April 1, 1987, at AI, col. 6; 
LeMoyne, Rebels Kill 43 Salvador Troops and US Adviser, N.Y. Times, April 1, 1987, at AI, col. 1; 
Cushman, Jr., Hundreds of Trainers Stationed Around Globe, N.Y. Times, April 5, 1987, at E2, col. 6; 
Salvador's Rebels: Alive and Deadly, NEWSWEEK, April 13, 1987, at 32. 
54Id. 
55 Aleman, supra note 53, at A8, col 6. It is interesting to note that no one was ever convicted 
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19, 1985, guerrillas killed four U.S. Marines while they ate at a cafe in San Salvador. 56 
Most recently, on March 26, 1987, a CIA agent was killed along with four Salvadoran 
soldiers when his American-made combat helicopter crashed on a training mission.57 
While these events may seem anecdotal, they are in fact evidence of extensive U.S. troop 
involvement in hostilities in El Salvador. 
A second difficulty with the Reagan assertion that United States troops are not 
"involved in hostilities" in El Salvador is the fact that the Administration itself has 
previously gone on record with an opposite determination. A report by the Comptroller 
General of the United States, entitled The Applicability of Certain Laws That Pertain to 
United States Military Involvement in El Salvador, indicates that American military personnel 
currently stationed in that country are drawing special "hostile fire pay."58 In order to 
receive such pay, a soldier must sign a monthly statement certifying that "[he] was 
subjected to hostile fire."59 This fact, like the documented attacks on U.S. servicemen in 
El Salvador, supports the proposition that U.S. troops are indeed "involved in hostilities" 
under the Resolution. 
In recognizing the foregoing inconsistencies in the Administration's Central Amer-
ican policy, Congress has expressed disdain for the apparent disregard of the War Powers 
Resolution. On May 1, 1981, 29 members of Congress, in Crockett v. Reagan, brought 
suit against the President and other United States government officials challenging "the 
legality of the U.S. presence in, and military assistance to, El Salvador."60 
The principal contention of the plaintiffs was that the United States military has 
been introduced into situations in El Salvador where "imminent involvement in hostili-
ties" has been, and continues to be, "indicated by the circumstances."61 Consequently, 
President Reagan's failure to report to Congress is a violation of the War Powers Reso-
lution, and also of the "necessary and proper clause" of the Constitution.62 Plaintiffs 
sought an injunction directing the U.S. government to withdraw all members of the 
of the killing. Originally a Salvadoran, Pedro Daniel Alvarado, was arrested in the murder. He was 
finally released, after he was tortured, on the basis that he was not involved. See generally Tyler, 
U.S. Faults Arrest of Salvadoran, Wash. Post, Nov. 12, 1983 at AI, col. 2; Salvador Suspect is Defended, 
N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1983 at A13, col. 5. 
56 Aleman, supra note 53, at A8, col. 6. 
57 See Former Scituate Man Dies in Crash of Salvadoran Military Helicopter, Boston Globe, Mar. 31, 
1987 at A78, col. I; American Dies in Copter Crash, N.Y.Times, April 1, 1987, at AlO, col. 6. 
58 COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, ApPLICABILITY OF CERTAIN LAWS THAT PER-
TAIN TO UNITED STATES MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN EL SALVADOR, (1982); COMPTROLLER GENERAL 
OF THE UNITED STATES, ApPLICABILITY OF CERTAIN LAWS THAT PERTAIN TO UNITED STATES MILITARY 
INVOLVEMENT IN EL SALVADOR (1984). 
59 Id. 
60 Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893 (D. D.C. 1982), afl'd, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
Similarly, taxpayers have also sought to challenge U.S. troop involvement in El Salvador. It has been 
held that they have no standing on which to challenge the Administration's Central American 
policies. Clark v. U.S., 609 F. Supp. 1249 (D. Md. 1985). 
61 558 F. Supp. at 816. 
62 Id. at 896. Though it was ancillary to their major argument in Crockett, plaintiffs also alleged 
that violations of human rights by the Government of El Salvador are widespread, and that U.S. 
military assistance consequently violates the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Jd. at 902. For a more 
complete discussion of the Foreign Assistance Act and its effect on U.S. military intervention in EI 
Salvador, see infra notes 74-Il5 and accompanying text. 
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United States Armed Forces, weapons, military equipment and aid for El Salvador and 
to prohibit any future aid. 53 
The district court dismissed all of the plaintiffs' claims, without discussing the merits 
of the suit.54 The court held that the issues presented by the plaintiffs constituted non-
justiciable political questions.55 The court also held that the equitable discretion doctrine, 
which advocates "strict judicial constraint in suits brought by members of Congress 
concerning matters of State," applied.56 The decision of the court in Crockett was upheld 
on appeal.57 
Although plaintiffs' claims were dismissed, it is important to note that the court in 
Crockett indicated that its decision would not necessarily preclude future judicial review 
in similar cases.58 The Crockett case simply presented too many "subtleties of fact-finding" 
regarding the involvement of U.S. troops in hostilities, and as such was not conducive 
to judicial scrutiny.59 Other cases, the court noted, might present a clearer set of facts 
that the court could investigate easier.70 The Crockett court cited the war in Indo-China 
as one example of the type of conflict that was "less elusive."71 U.S. involvement in the 
Vietnam conflict "had cost $lOO billion and 1 million lives."72 Thus, it would be "absurd" 
for a court to deny, given these facts, that U.S. armed forces were involved in "hostilities," 
as defined by the War Powers Resolution. 73 
While the Crockett court felt that the situation in El Salvador presented too many 
"subtleties of fact-finding," in Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith,74 a district court took judicial 
notice of the atrocities in El Salvador, noting: 
... [T]he violent conditions in El Salvador are a matter of public record 
and are corroborated by all available accounts. The Court therefore believes 
that it can take judicial notice of the following facts without having to "second 
guess" the Executive Branch's analysis of events in El Salvador ... (1) El 
Salvador is currently in the midst of a widespread civil war; (2) the continuing 
military actions ... create a substantial danger of violence to civilians residing 
in El Salvador; (3) both governmental forces and guerrillas have been re-
sponsible for political persecution and human rights violations in the form 
of unexplained disappearances, arbitrary arrests, torture, and murder.75 
63Id. at 897. 
64Id. at 903. 
55 !d. at 898. 
66Id. at 903. The equitable discretion doctrine was articulated in Riegle v. Federal Open Market 
Committee, 656 F.2d 873, 881-82 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981). 
67 720 F. Supp. 1355. 
68 558 F. Supp. at 899. 
69Id. 
7°Id. at 898. 
71Id. 
72Id. at 898-99. 
73Id. 
74 Orantes v. Smith, supra note 10 at 351. (Plaintiff brought suit against the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) regarding the INS's alleged detention, processing and deportation of 
Salvadoran aliens, based on the failure of the INS to grant them political asylum. The court held 
that the Salvadorans were entitled to a preliminary injunction prohibiting the INS from engaging 
in those practices.) 
75 !d. at 358. The ability of courts to take judicial notice of repression in foreign countries is 
well-established. Id. at 358-59, n.8. 
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In sum, it is clear that U.S. troops are involved in hostilities in El Salvador, and that 
this involvement runs afoul of the War Powers Resolution. The Resolution was intended 
to force the President to notify Congress of any U.S. troop involvement so as to prevent 
covert miltary actions, and Congress defined "hostilities" broadly enough to include the 
situation in El Salvador. However, the Administration argues that U.S. troops are not 
involved in hostilities in El Salvador, though officials have repeatedly contradicted them-
selves. This has included admitting in the past that troops are under enemy fire. In 
addition, American troops have died in battle in El Salvador. Clearly, under the with-
drawal provision of the War Powers Resolution, United States troops, including advisers, 
must be withdrawn from El Salvador. 
B. United States Intervention in El Salvador is Illegal Based on the Human Rights Violations 
of the Duarte Regime 
In 1961, Congress passed the Foreign Assistance Act, and the 1973 amendments 
added section 502b. The Foreign Assistance Act was designed to prevent the United 
States government from providing "security assistance" to foreign countries that "engage 
in the violation of human rights."76 Section 502b currently reads "[n]o security assistance 
may be provided to any country the government of which engages in a consistent pattern 
of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights."77 
Under the current 502b criteria, El Salvador should not receive aid from the United 
States. The "security assistance" currently provided by the U.S. to El Salvador, in the 
form of weapons and personnel, is against the spirit of 502b.78 Furthermore, this assis-
tance to El Salvador continues despite the fact that section 502b is being violated due to 
the continued human rights violations by the El Salvdoran government. 
The Salvadoran government, officially through the use of the armed forces and 
unofficially through the death squads, engages in a "consistent pattern of gross violations 
of internationally recognized human rights."79 For example, the government has recently 
76 22 U.S.C. § 2304 et seq. (1982). 502(b) was added to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 in 
1973 (Pub. L. No. 93-189, § 32, 87 Stat. 714, 733 (1973), has been codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 22 U.S.C.). By stating that the promotion of human rights should be "a principal goal 
of the foreign policy of the United States," this provision elevates the protection of human rights 
to a level heretofore unattained in United States foreign policy. 22 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(I). The provision 
has been amended twice since 1974, and each time Congress strengthened the language of 502(b). 
In 1976, the "sense of Congress" standard was replaced by the words "the policy of the United 
States," which still did not amount to a binding legal requirement. Int'l Sec. Ass. and Arms Export 
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-329, § 301, 90 Stat. 729, 748 (1976). So, in 1979 Congress deleted the 
newly added "it is the policy of the United States" language. 
7722 U.S.C. 2304 (a)(2) (Supp. V 1981). 
78 The definitions for § 502(b) are provided in 22 U.S.C. § 2304(d). According to that provision 
in the Code, "gross violations of internationally recognized human rights" includes "torture or 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged detention without charges and 
trial, causing the disappearance of persons by the abduction and clandestine detention of those 
persons, and other flagrant denial of the rights to life, liberty or the security of the person." [d. In 
addition, the term "security assistance" means "military assistance, education or training, or eco-
nomic assistance." For a discussion of the extent of the current assistance provided by the United 
States to the Government of El Salvador, see supra notes 32-35, and accompanying text. 
79 According to interviews with released prisoners, the Salvadoran government tortures civilians 
using electric shock, rape, murder, sleep deprivation of a week or more, the use of a torture hood 
called a capucha, lit cigarettes and the twisting of limbs. See R. HILLER, PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE 
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begun strafing civilians in areas believed to be rebel strongholds in attacks that have 
brought international condemnation.8o This is part of the "drying up" strategy of the 
Salvadoran military, a technique that is designed to end peasant support for the insur-
gents by first bombing civilian areas, then "rescuing" the victims by ferrying them out 
and interrogating them.81 Indeed, large groups of civilians seem to be the most frequent 
target of the Salvadoran Army.82 
In Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, the court discussed some of the Salvadoran military 
attacks on civilians in detail.s, For example, one plaintiff in the suit recounted the 
murders of her uncles, and the torture of her parents.84 Another witnessed the murder 
of seven friends. 85 The court noted that this testimony was both "credible" and "well-
corroborated"86 and that the "pervasive and arbitrary violence in El Salvador has been 
amply documented."87 
However, the Salvadoran government's litany of human rights abuses does not end 
with attacks on Salvadoran civilians.88 The government also terrorizes non-Salvadoran 
citizens.89 These actions, including rape, torture, and murder, like the attacks on groups 
LAWYER'S COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 8 (1985). It has been estimated by a Central American 
human rights organization, Tutela Legal, that in 1985 there were more than 240 murders and 81 
kidnappings committed by the government armed forces and death squads. In addition, there were 
371 civilian victims of indiscriminate attacks by the armed forces and another 1,045 victims of 
miscellaneous attacks. See WATCH COMMITTEES, CRITIQUE: REVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES DEPART-
MENT OF STATE'S COUNTRY REpORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1985 24, 25 (1986). See also 
El Salvador, 30 I.C.]. REVIEW II, 13 (july 1983); LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS, FREE FIRE: A REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN EL SALVADOR (1984). Ahlberg, El Salvador's 
Duarte is a Prisoner of War, UTNE READER, April 1987, at 13. LeMoyne, In Salvador Village, Can There 
be Peace of Mind?, N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 1987, at A6, col. 3. 
80 Spektor, supra note 4, at II. See also Jensen, The Bombing of El Salvador, UTNE READER, 
November 1986 at 85 ; LeMoyne, Salvadoran Air Raid Reported in Town, N.Y. Times, Feb. I, 1987, 
at All, col. I; El Salvador, 37 I.C.]. REVIEW 9, 10 (Dec. 1986). 
81Id. See also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL STATEMENT FOR HEARINGS ON CENTRAL AMERICAN 
COUNTER-TERRORISM ACT OF 1985, before the House Foreign Affairs Comm. 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(Nov. 19, 1985) at 10-11. 
82 Ambassador Deane R. Hinton has noted "since 1979 perhaps as many as 30,000 Salvadorans 
have been killed illegally, that is, not in battle. Less than 150() of these 'crimes against the person.' 
that is homicide, assault and battery, kidnapping, rape, torture, have been prosecuted .... Most 
striking of all, there have been less than 200 convictions for the crimes." UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT 
OF STATE, REPORT ON THE SITUATION IN EL SALVADOR WITH RESPECT OF THE SUBJECTS COVERED IN 
SECTION 728 OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION ACT OF 1981, Pub. L. 
No. 97-113, Jan. 21, 1983, Appendix D at 4. Other estimates put the number of civilians murdered 
at 40,000. El Salvador, supra note 80, at 10. For a thorough discussion of attacks by Salvadoran 
troops on civilians, see LAWYER'S WATCH COMMITTEE, HUMAN RIGHTS DISMISSED (1986). 
83 541 F. Supp. at 356-58. 
84 Id. at 356. 
85Id. 
86Id. at 357. 
87Id. at 358. 
88 In addition to harassing civilians, the Salvadoran Army has kidnapped 30 mayors who 
supported the guerrillas, though there is no evidence that they were harmed. El Salvador, supra 
note 80, at II. 
89 For good general discussions of human rights violations in El Salvador, see LAWYER'S COM-
MITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, CRITIQUE: REVIEW OF THE DEPT. OF STATE'S COUNTRY REpORTS OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1985 24-30 (1986); THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION RECORD ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN 1985, 53-60 (1986); SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION ON THE NOVEMBER 1985 
UNITED NATIONS REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN EL SALVADOR (1986). 
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of civilians, often go unpunished.90 For example, four Dutch journalists were murdered 
in 1982.91 Three American labor advisors were shot to death in 1981.92 Clergy have been 
tortured and murdered.93 Recently. a United States embassy employee was raped and 
tortured by Salvadoran Treasury police.94 The most notorious attack on U.S. citizens 
was the torture and murder of four United States churchwomen. 
The four nuns, Maura Clarke, Ita Ford, Dorothy Kazel and Jean Donovan were 
tortured and murdered on December 2, 1980. An investigation began almost immedi-
ately and on April 29, 1981, after intense pressure from the U.S. embassy, the Salvadoran 
government arrested six National Guardsmen.95 The men were found guilty by a Sal-
vadoran jury of aggravated homicide, robbery, and destruction of property at the con-
clusion of the five hour trial, even though the chief defense lawyer later revealed that 
90 For the best account of the crimes that resulted in no convictions, see HUMAN RIGHTS 
DISMISSED, supra note 82, which is devoted entirely to an analysis of unresolved cases. The Inter-
p.ational Court of Justice has noted that "[o)ne of the factors contributing to the flourishing of 
human rights abuses in El Salvador is the continuing failure of the judicial system to prosecute and 
punish criminal acts by members of the Salvadoran Armed Forces." El Salvador, supra note 80, at 
10. 
9\ The four Dutch journalists, Jacobus Koster, Jan Kuiper, Han ter Laag, and Johannes Wil-
lamson, were shot to death on March 17, 1982 by Salvadoran army troops as they travelled to rebel-
controlled territory to film a television documentary on life in rural El Salvador for the Dutch 
Interchurch Broadcasting Co. (IKON). See R. BONNER, WEAKNESS AND DECEIT: U.S. POLICY AND EL 
SALVADOR (1984); Simons, Dutch Gov't Report Questions El Salvador's Account of Killings, Wash. Post, 
April 15, 1982, at A35, col. 1. 
92 On January 3, 1981, 3 members of the American Institute for Free Labor Development 
(AIFLD), Michael Hammer, Mark David Pearlman and Jose Rudolfo Viera, were shot to death at 
the San Salvador Sheraton as they ate dinner. Suspects were arrested in February 1986, and have 
been convicted and sentenced to 30 years in prison. However, the men identified by the "triggermen" 
as the intellectual authors of the crime, Capt. Ernesto Alfonso Avila and Lt. Isidrio Lopez Sibrian 
of the Salvadoran Armed Forces, have not been prosecuted for any crime. It is widely known, 
however, that Salvadoran military officials took part in the crimes. See e.g., El Salvador Promotes 
Officers Tied to Killings, N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1986, at A7, col. 1; Salvador Arrest Reported in Killing of 
Americans, N.Y. Times, December 20, 1983, at A9, col. 1. 
93 On November 21, 1984, Rev. David Ernesto Fernandez, a Lutheran Minister, was shot to 
death after having been tortured. See Salvadoran Suspect Minister Slain by Death Squad, Dallas Morning 
News, Nov. 25, 1984, at AI, col. 1. Another clergyman, the Archbishop of San Salvador, Oscar 
Arnesto Romero, was assassinated on March 24, 1980. One of the most outspoken and respected 
Salvadoran church leaders, Archbishop Romero was shot in the head as he said mass in the Divine 
Providence Hospital in San Salvador. The murderer has since been identified as Walter Antonio 
Alverez, a Salvadoran National Guardsman who claimed that he acted on instructions from Roberto 
d'Aubuisson, President of the Arena Party. Unfortunately for investigators, Alvarez was shot to 
death while watching a soccer game in September 1981, and his assailant escaped unharmed. The 
case concerning the. Archbishop'S murder was subsequently closed. See generally Pyes, Who Killed 
Archbishop Romero: D'Aubuisson's Role, NATION, Oct. 13, 1984, at 337; Bennett, Duarte Ties d'Aubuisson 
to Archbishop'S Murder, Boston Globe, Nov. 24, 1987, at AI, col. 1. 
94 On September 16, 1985 Graciela Menedez de Iglesias, a Salvadoran employee of the United 
States embassy in San Salvador, and an agriculture specialist for the Agency for International 
Development, was abducted, raped and tortured by Salvadoran Treasury police. There has been 
no investigation of Ms. Iglesia's mistreatment. See McCartney, Ex U.S. Employee Alleges Torture, Wash. 
Post, March 11, 1986, at A16, col. 1. 
95 Colindres Aleman, Daniel Ramirez, Salvador Franco, Francisco Recinos, Carlos Palacios, and 
Jose Canjura were charged with the crime. The United States withheld $19 million, 113 of that 
year's package, until a verdict was reached. HUMAN RIGHTS DISMISSED, supra note 82, at 63. 
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he was part of a conspiracy to protect high ranking military and government officials 
from being implicated in the murders.96 
In the wake of the murders and the growing awareness and interest concerning 
Salvadoran human rights violations in general, Congress sought to further strengthen 
section 502b by making it directly applicable to the situation in El Salvador.97 Congress 
found that the Executive Branch had failed to apply section 502b to a single foreign 
government engaged in "gross violations of human rights," and thus country-specific 
legislation was the only way that Congress could gain cooperation from the President.98 
Consequently, in the Internal Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981, 
Congress included several sections that formulated specific guidelines for continuing aid 
to El Salvador.99 Most important of these is the section 728 certification provision, which 
mandates a semi-annual review of El Salvador's human rights record. tOO 
Under section 728 of the Act, the President can extend military assistance to El 
Salvador only if he certifies in writing to the Speaker of the House of Representatives 
and to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations every six months 
that the Salvadoran government is taking steps to remedy the human rights situation. lol 
these steps include controlling the armed forces so as to stop torture, implementing 
land reform, and allowing all significant political parties to participate in the political 
process through free elections. t02 Section 728 differed significantly from the broader 
96 The lawyer, Salvador Antonio Ibarra, was tortured when he first threatened to go public 
with the conspiracy information. A classified report prepared for the State Department in 1983 by 
former Federal District Judge Harold E. Tyler found that the Salvadoran government had sought 
to "conceal the perpetrators from justice" through a pair of "sham" investigations that would "create 
a written record absolving the Salvadoran security forces of responsibility for the murders." Sal-
vadoran Lawyer Charges Cover-up in Slaying of u.s. Nuns, N.V. Times, May 6, 1985, at AI, col. 5. 
97 See SALVADORAN REFUGEES IN HONDURAS: HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON INTER-AMER-
ICAN AFFAIRS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); U.S. POLICY 
OPTIONS IN EL SALVADOR: HEARINGS AND MARKUP ON H. CON. RES. 197 AND H. CON. RES. 212 
BEFORE THE HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND ITs SUBCOMM. ON INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS OF 
THE HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). 
98 See Cohen, Conditioning U.S. Security Assistance on Human Rights Practices, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 
256 (1982). 
99 The intent of 728 was to tighten Congressional control over U.S. policy in EI Salvador, 
presumably because of concern about the human rights situation. 39 CONGo Q. WEEKLY REP. 2497 
(Dec. 19, 1981); 22 U.S.c. § 2370 (1982) and 22 U.S.C. § 2370 (note)(1982). 
100 The provision directed the President to determine whether the government in EI Salvador: 
(I) is making a concerted and significant effort to comply with internationally recog-
nized human rights; 
(2) is achieving substantial control over all elements of its own armed forces, so as to 
bring an end to the indiscriminate torture and murder of Salvadoran citizens by these 
forces; 
(3) is making continued progress in implementing essential economic and political 
reforms, including the land reform program; 
(4) is committed to the holding of free elections at an early date and to that end has 
demonstrated its good faith efforts to begin discussions with all major political factions 
in EI Salvador which have declared their willingness to find and implement an equitable 
political solution to the conflict, with such solution to involve a commitment to: 
(A) a renouncement of further military and paramilitary activity; and 
(B) the electoral process with internationally recognized observers. 
728 (d), codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2370 (note) (1982). 
IOlld. 
102 !d. 
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provIsIOns of section 502b. First, it applied specifically to one country, El Salvador. 
Second, it prohibited aid until a positive certification of human rights advancements was 
made. It thus presumed that human rights violations do exist in El Salvador, and placed 
the burden on the President to demonstrate that he was complying with the provisions 
of section 502b by forcing the Salvadoran government to adhere to the restrictions of 
section 728. Unfortunately, just as the President has failed to meet the criteria of 502b, 
so has he failed to meet the criteria of 728. 
First, the President failed to comply procedurally with section 728. Some of the 
recent certifications have been inadequate under the statute because they were made by 
Secretary of State George Schultz, rather than by the President as required by law. lo3 
Secretary of State Schultz signed the report, and transmitted it "under the President's 
authority" to the Speaker of the HOltse. 104 However, the effect of this is uncertain, since 
the statute does not specify whether or not the certification is invalid if it is in fact made, 
but not by the President. lo5 
Second, the President has failed to comply substantively with section 728. Although 
the President has continued to certify that human rights conditions in El Salvador are 
improving, in fact they are not. 106 In short, the certifications are false.107 Patricia Derian~ 
former Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights under President Carter, after 
visiting El Salvador recently, wrote that "every six months the President certifies that 
progress is being made on human rights in El Salvador. Progress is not being made."108 
Derian is not alone in her assessment of the situation. Senator Christopher Dodd, 
the author of section 728, declared that President Reagan's certifications are "unwar-
ranted" and that "the Administration will certify regardless of the circumstances."109 He 
further noted "certification is a farce, it's irrelevant. We've spent $748 million there in 
three years ... and what do we have to show for it? The military and political situations 
aren't improving at all."IlO 
Thus, it is clear that the Reagan Administration considers the certification provision 
of section 728 unimportant. III For example, Alexander Haig, while Secretary of State, 
103 "The President shall certify .... (emphasis added). /d. 
104 N.Y. Times, jan. 22,1983, at AI, col. I. 
105 22 U.S.c. § 2370 (note)(l982). 
106 The United Nations has found that "cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment continues, 
especially in the illegal interrogations of political prisoners, often giving rise to confessions which 
do not reflect the truth." U.N. Doc. A/40/818 at paragraph 169. Furthermore, the on-going "human 
rights nightmare is likely to continue." LAWYER'S COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, SITUATION OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN EL SALVADOR, 3 (1985). 
107 As recently as 1985, death squads still killed over 30 people a month. LAWYER'S COMMITTEE 
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S RECORD ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN 1985,54 (1986). 
For other criticisms of the Reagan Administration's certifications see e.g., Certifying Evil, NATION, 
jan. 22, 1983 at 67: Cohn, U.S. Group Cites Torture, Starvation: Salvadoran Health Abuses Reported, 
Wash. Post, january 21, 1983, at A24, col. I; Dickey, Expected Certification for El Salvador Based on 
Mixed Record, Wash. Post, jan. 21, 1983, at A19, col. I; Marcus, A.C.L.U. Disputes Reagan Assessment 
of Conditions in El Salvador, Wash. Post, july 9, 1982, at A4, col. I. 
108 Derian, El Salvador: This is Progress?, Wash. Post, Feb. 6, 1983, at B7, col. 3. 
109 41 CONGo Q. WEEKLY REP. 217 (Jan. 29,1983). 
110 N.V. Times, Feb. 29, 1983, § 6 (Magazine) at 34-36. See also Moody, El Salvador: Riddled with 
Fear, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 16, 1987, at 44; Bennett, New Salvadoran Killings Fuel Fears of Death Squads' 
Return, Boston Globe, Nov. 15, 1987, at AI, col. 5. 
III Amb. Deane R. Hinton, admits that "when national interests are thought to be at stake, the 
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noted that human rights issues in Central America were "sissy stuff, fancy pants stuff."1I2 
Assistant Secretary of State Elliot Abrams also sought to downplay the importance of 
human rights violations in EI Salvador, saying "it is a tactic every time there is a battle 
and a significant number of people are killed to say that they're victims of human rights 
abuses."'13 President Reagan himself thinks that the semi-annual human rights certifi-
cations are "unnecessary"lI\ and has consistently told the U.S. Ambassador to the United 
Nations to veto resolutions of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights condemning 
human rights violations in EI Salvador. liS 
Therefore, as a result of his long-standing dislike of the section 728 certification 
provision, President Reagan refused to sign a bill, H.R. 4042, continuing section 728 
when it expired on November 30, 1983, invoking a "pocket veto."1I6 Consequently, the 
sponsor of the reenactment bill, Rep. Michael Barnes, along with 38 other members of 
Congress, filed suit in Barnes v. Carmen challenging the validity of the President's use of 
a pocket veto during a congressional recess. 1 I7 
Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that H.R. 4042, which was passed by both 
houses of Congress but not signed by President Reagan, became a validly enacted law.1I8 
They also sought a writ of mandamus or a permanent injunction directing the Executive 
Clerk of the White House to publish H.R. 4042 as a public law.1I9 
In Barnes v. Carmen, the district court concluded that defendants were entitled to 
summary judgment because the pocket veto made during the congressional recess was 
a valid exercise of Presidential power under the Constitution. 120 Relying on the Supreme 
Court decision in The Pocket Veto Case, the court found that a pocket veto is a permissible 
political tool of the President. I2I Furthermore, the Court rejected the plaintiffs' claims 
that recent lower court decisions "so attenuated Pocket Veto as to deprive it of controlling 
force."122 
The plaintiffs appealed the lower court's decision.123 The appellate court held first 
that plaintiffs alleged an injury sufficient to create standing, namely an injury to the law-
making powers of the two houses of Congress. 124 Second, the court held that the dispute 
was not beyond the court's authority and that the court should not shirk its duties simply 
because the parties· in the lawsuit were from coordinate branches of government. 125 
Reagan Administration is less likely to make a finding of no progress in El Salvador, even if that 
means ignoring obvious human rights abuses." See Wash. Post, Jan. 19, 1983, at A I, coL I. 
112 NY Times, Oct. 19, 1982, at A22, coL 3. 
113 Nightline, (ABC Television broadcast, Feb. 18, 1985) (transcription on file at Third World 
Law Journal office). 
114 16 WEEKLY COMPo RES. Doc. 1627 (Nov. 30, 1983). 
115 See M. CRAHAN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND BASIC NEEDS IN THE AMERICAS, 334 (1982). 
116 H.R. 4042, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONGo REC. H7777 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1984). 
117 Barnes V. Carmen, 582 F. Supp. 163 (D. D.C. 1984), rev., 743 F.2d 45, announced, 759 F.2d 
21 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
118Id. at 164. 
"" !d. 
'2°Id. at 168. 
121Id. at 166-68, citing The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655 (1929). 
122Id. at 167-68, citing Wright V. United States, 302 U.S. 583 (1938), Kennedy V. Sampson, 
511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
123 Barnes V. Kline, 743 F.2d 45, announced 759 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
124 759 F.2d at 26. 
'25Id. at 28-30. 
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Third, the court held that the adjournment of the Ninety-Eighth Congress at the end 
of the first session did not prevent the return of H.R. 4042 to Congress, so the circum-
stances needed for the Constitutional use of a pocket veto were not present. 126 
Citing those three factors, the appellate court reversed the lower court's decision, 
and issued an order to the district court to enter judgment for appellants. 127 Thus, 
despite President Reagan's attempted veto, H.R. 4042 became law, and the certification 
provisions of section 702b of the Foreign Assistance Act were reinstated, and remain in 
force. 128 The Barnes decision is significant because the court did not hesitate in rendering 
a decision that could be seen as anti-Administration. The appellate court in Barnes could 
have applied the equitable discretion doctrine, as the Crockett court had done, and thus 
avoided addressing the issues presented altogether. However, the court did not "shirk 
its duties", and so provided the plaintiffs with the relief sought. 
There is no remedy under Section 728 if the certifications are proven to be unwar-
ranted. However, if the President fails to make "a certification at the specified time" then 
the statute dictates the procedures to be foliowed. 129 The President shall immediately: 
(1) Suspend all expenditures of funds and other deliveries of assistance to 
El Salvador .... 
(2) Withold all approvals for use of credits and guarantees for El Salvador 
(3) Suspend all deliveries of defense articles, defense services, and design 
and construction services to El Salvador .... 
(4) Order the prompt withdrawal from El Salvador of all members of the 
Armed Forces performing defense services, conducting international military 
education and training activities, or performing management functions un-
der ... the Foreign Assistance Act .... 130 
Congress clearly intended that u.S. aid to El Salvador be severed in the event that 
any Section 728 human rights certification was not forthcoming. It may be argued that 
a false certification would also trigger those provisions, and that because the weight of 
the evidence indicates that the current certifications are indeed false, that all u.S. aid to 
El Salvador should be stopped, pending Congressional investigation. If aid was stopped 
pursuant to section 728, at least the government of El Salvador would be forced to prove 
affirmatively that it was making a "concerted and significant effort to comply with 
internationally recognized human rights."131 In short, until the Duarte regime has proven 
conclusively that it is complying with section 728, u.S. aid to El Salvador should cease 
in accordance with domestic United States law. 
IV. THE HISTORY OF UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT IN NICARAGUA 
United States involvement in the affairs of Nicaragua began in the mid-1830's. In 
1837 President Martin Van Buren sent an emissary to Nicaragua to negotiate a U.S. 
right-of-way across a proposed interoceanic canal through that country. However, the 
126 [d. at 30-4l. 
127 [d. at 4l. 
128 [d. 
129 22 U.S.C. § 2370 (note) at (c)(l)-(4). 
130 [d. 
131Id. at (d)(l). 
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talks collapsed and the canal project was never completed. 132 After the failure of the 
canal, the United States had little contact with Nicaragua until the 1850's. In 1854, after 
a group of Nicaraguans attacked the United States Foreign Ministry in San Juan del 
Norte, the U.S. warship Cayne shelled that city. In addition, the U.S. military invaded 
Nicaragua four times in the 1850's.133 
In 1912, United States Marines once again invaded Nicaragua, this time to support 
a Conservative Party revolt against President Jose Santos Zelaya, whose political stance 
was anti-United States. The Marines occupied Nicaragua for 21 years. 134 It was this 
occupation by the U.S. that bred the current political tensions between the United States 
and Nicaragua. 
In 1931, finding the U.S. intervention unbearable, Augusto Cesar Sandino organized 
an army of peasants and farmers that had the support of many Nicaraguans. 13s His 
army, known as the Defensive Army of National Sovereignty, eventually defeated the 
United States Marines. 136 However, before the Marines left in 1933, they established the 
Nicaraguan National Guard as a "watchdog", and handpicked Anastasio Somoza Garcia 
as its leader. 137 Somoza saw himself as a representative of the U.S. government, and was 
considered a close ally of Washington. 13s Somoza subsequently ousted the President of 
Nicaragua, Juan Baustista Secasa in 1936, and appointed himself dictator. Establishing 
a regime that became known for its ruthlessness, Somoza ruled the country for twenty 
years until his assassination in 1956. 139 Somoza's eldest son, Luis Somoza Debayle, became 
dictator and held that position until his death in 1967. At that point, his brother Anastasio 
Somoza Debayle became the Nicaraguan head of state. 
By 1967, the Somoza family had become Nicaragua's largest landholder. Agrarian 
reforms were nonexistent, with only 7% of the country's surface farmed, and over one-
half of that land was owned by Somoza. 140 In addition, in a country where the average 
132 See BERRY & PREUSCH, supra note 3, at 271. 
133 The years were 1850, 1853, 1854 and 1857. In addition, U.S. Marines landed in Nicaragua 
in 1894, 1896, 1898, 1899 and 1910. Chomsky, supra note 19, at 72. 
134 The United States also supplied financial advisors to manage Nicaragua's fiscal affairs during 
the time that troops were there. Id. 
135 For a general discussion of the life and times of Sandino, see G. SELSER, SANDINO, (1981). 
For a critical discussion of Sandino and his followers, and their impact on the current unrest in 
Nicaragua, see D. HODGES, INTELLECTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE NICARAGUAN REVOLUTION, (1987). 
136 Sandi no became known as the "General of Free Men," in honor of his role in the "liberation 
of Nicaragua from the imperialist United States." Y. DILLING & P. WHEATON, NICARAGUA: A PEOPLE'S 
REVOLUTION, 1-3 (1980). 
137 See E. CRAWLEY, OLD DICTATORS NEVER DIE: A PORTRAIT OF NICARAGUA AND THE SOMOZA 
DYNASTY (1979); R. MILLETT, THE GUARDIANS OF THE DYNASTY: A HISTORY OF THE U.S.-CREATED 
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA AND THE SOMOZA FAMILY, (1977). 
138 President Franklin D. Roosevelt once said about Somoza: "He's a sonofabitch, but he's ours." 
TIME, November 15, 1948, at 43. Somoza said in 1934: 
I have come from the United States Embassy where I have had a conference with 
Ambassador Arturo Bliss, who has assured me that the government in Washington 
supports and recommends the elimination of Augusto Cesar Sandino for considering 
him a disturber of the peace of the country. 
BERRY & PREUSCH, supra note 3, at 269. Somoza saw this as a call to action. Shortly after Somoza's 
1934 statement, Sandino was assassinated while returning home from dinner at the Presidential 
palace. Many think that Somoza ordered the killing. CRAWLEY, supra note 137, at 86. 
139 CRAWLEY, supra note 137, at 120; R. ELMAN, COCKTAILS AT SOMOZA'S (1981). 
140 CRAWLEY, supra note 137, at 138, 141. 
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yearly per capita income was $350, the Somoza family had wealth estimated at over one 
billion dollars by 1977.!4! Political corruption and graft were prevalent.!42 In fact, the 
only way of staying in business in Nicaragua was to "make a contribution to the Somoza 
family."!43 Somoza was the State.!44 His dictatorship has been termed "the longest, most 
corrupt dictatorship in Latin America, a dictatorship continually supplied and supported 
by the United States".!45 
In 1961, various guerilla forces joined together under the banner of the Frente 
Sandinista de Liberacion N acional (FSLN, or Sandinistas) to fight against the Somoza 
regime.!46 Their goal was to "wage war on the Somoza family" and to defeat "yankee 
imperialism"!47 However, by the mid-1970's, because of internal conflict, the FSLN found 
itself divided into three political factions. As a result, in January 1979, the FSLN elected 
a nine person directorate to unite the three different groups.!48 
On July 19, 1979, the Sandinistas overthrew the United States-backed Somozan 
regime.!49 In the aftermath of the coup, fearing death at the hands of the Sandinistas, 
thousands of soldiers in Somoza's National Guard fled Nicaragua to begin civilian lives 
in the United States. However, a group of approximately sixty of the former guardsmen 
formed a terrorist guerilla group to fight the Sandinista Government.!50 
In late 1981, the C.I.A. organized the ex-guardsmen, labeling them the Nicaraguan 
Democratic Force (FDN), or "contras."!5! The C.I.A. initially created two plans of op-
141Id. at 138, 141, 158. In addition, the Somoza family had a monopoly on many of the 
country's most important industries. These included the airline, television station, newspaper, 
cement plant, textile mill, sugar refinery and distillery. BERRY & PREUSCH, supra note 3, at 272. 
142Id. at 87-167. 
143 CRAWLEY, supra note 137, at 96. 
144 /d. at 130. In addition, it should be noted that Somoza's regime harmed the farmers and 
peasants of Nicaragua as well as the political and merchant class. Seven of every ten Nicaraguans 
could not read or write under Somoza, and three of every 1000 attended college. Infant mortality 
was high, and malnutrition was widespread. More murders occurred every year in Nicaragua than 
anywhere else in the world. Id. at 167. 
145 Janquin & Barneto, A Dictatorship Made in the U.S.A, in P. ROSSET & J. VANDERMEER, NICA-
RAGUA: UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, supra note 7, at 161. 
146 The FSLN was organized to renew the struggle of Augusto Sandino, and in fact borrowed 
his name to become known as the "Sandinistas." Id. at 159-68; BERRY & PREUSCH, supra note 3, at 
273. 
147 CRAWLEY, supra note 137, at 128. 
148 The three groups are the Proletarios (Proletariats), Guerra Popular Prolongada (GPP-The 
Prolonged People's War), Tercistas (Third Force). For a good look at this aspect of the FSLN, see 
J. BOOTH, THE END AND THE BEGINNING: THE NICARAGUAN REVOLUTION, 140-150 (1982). 
149 SELSER, supra note 135, at 206. 
150 Forty-six of the forty-eight contra leaders had been leaders in the Somoza guard. BERRY & 
PREUSCH, supra note 3, at 277. For discussions of the transition from the Somoza National Guard 
to the C.I.A.-organized anti-Sandinista terrorist group, see Honor Prevented Us From Serving the New 
Regime: Conversation with Isaias Cuadra Espinoza, The End justifies the Means: Conversation with jorge 
Zelaya, in D. EICH & C. RINCON, THE CONTRAS: INTERVIEWS WITH ANTI-SANDINISTAS, 3-10, 30-42 
(1986). For a good general history of the Reagan Administration's contra aid program since its 
inception in 1981 until the present see Engelberg, U.S. and the Nicaraguan Rebels: Six Years of Questions 
and Contradictions, N.V. Times, May 3,1987, at A14, col. 1. 
151 EICH & RINCON, supra note 150, at iii, 11-15; McManus & Toth, The Contras: How the U.S. 
Got Entangled, L.A. Times, March 4, 1985, at A3, col. 2; Oberdorfer & Tyler, U.S. Backed Nicaraguan 
Army Swells to 7,000 Men, Wash. Post, May 8, 1983 at AI, col. 3; Oberdorfer, C.I.A. Planning to Back 
More Nicaraguan Rebels, Wash. Post July 14, 1983, at AI, col. 3 
The contras are now technically composed of three separate groups, the Nicaraguas Democratic 
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eration for the contras. 152 The first, called Plan C, called for the FDN troops to attack 
Nicaragua from Honduran base camps, with the goal of establishing a "liberated terri-
tory."153 However, the contras were unsuccessful in their attempt, and Plan C failed. 154 
In its place, the C.I.A. instituted a second plan, Operation M83. This plan had a number 
of goals, including severing supply and communication lines between the contras. 15S The 
Sandinistas answered the contra attack with a change in tactics. Instead of trying to stop 
contra units at the Honduran border, the Sandinistas let them penetrate deep into the 
country where they were cut off from supplies of weapons, food and clothing. Thus 
Operation M83 also failed. 156 
In September 1983, President Reagan authorized a shift in contra training tactics, 
emphasizing the destruction of "vital economic targets."157 In answer to that order, the 
United States Armed Forces and the C.I.A. mined Nicaragua's three main ports in early 
1984. 158 At least eight ships were destroyed or damaged. 15g Furthermore, President 
Reagan said that through such actions, he wanted to force the Nicaraguan government 
to "say Uncle."160 Finally, both Secretary of State Schultz and President Reagan have 
indicated that, if necessary, U.S. troops will intervene directly.161 
Today, six years after they were formed, the United States government continues 
to support the contras. This is despite the fact that their sole goal is to use whatever 
means possible to reestablish a Somoza-like dictatorship, and once again engage in a 
systematic pattern of human rights violations and political corruption. 162 
The level of U.S. support to the contras is staggering. Currently, more than 700 
contra leaders are trained yearly in the United States in intensive six week sessions that 
Force (FDN), the United Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO), and the Misurasta. The FDN is the largest 
faction in the contras; UNO is the next largest. The Contras: Key Leaders, N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1987, 
at A6 col. 2. 
IS2 EICH & RINCON, supra note 150, at 11. 
IS3ld. 
IS4 ld. at 13. 
15sld. 
156ld. at 13-14. 
157 Wall St. j., Mar. 6, 1985, at A20, col. 1. 
158 These ports were: Corinto, Puerto Sandino, and EI Bluff. Wall St. j., Mar. 6, 1985, at AI, 
col. 1. It is chiefly the mining of these harbors that led to the suit before the International Court 
of Justice, discussed supra at note 8 and infra at note 168. 
15Y See, TIME, April 23, 1984, at 19-20. 
160 President's News Conference of Feb. 21, 1985,21 WEEKLY COMPo PRES. Doc. 213 (Feb. 21, 
1985). 
161 A Presidential report to Congress on April 3, 1985 stated: "Direct application of United 
States Military force, ... must realistically be recognized as an eventual option in the region, if 
other policy alternatives fail. " , ROSSET & VANDERMEER, supra note 7, at 273. In addition, Secretary 
of State Schultz has warned Congress that if they did not approve aid for the contras, they would 
be "hastening the day when the threat will grow, and we will be faced with an agonizing choice 
about the use of U.S. combat troops." ld. 
162 Sen. Thomas Harkin has noted that the contras "have promised to bring Managua a reign 
of terror that will make the French Revolution look like a Labor Day picnic. Their methods are 
like those of the Marquis de Sade." Speech by Sen. Thomas Harkin, "Contras or Contradora: 
Military Solution or Negotiated Settlement," March 26, 1985, cited in WASHINGTON REPORT ON THE 
HEMISPHERE, April 16, 1985. 
Edgar Chamorro, a former leader of the FDN's civilian directorate, has noted that the contras 
have no concrete political agenda. "The contras just want to return to the way things were before," 
and to "settle accounts with the Sandinistas." NEWSWEEK, April 29, 1985, at 26. 
242 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 7:223 
teach them basic military techniques and related specialized skills. 163 The C.I.A. has even 
prepared two warfare manuals for the contras to use in planning their attacks on the 
Sandinistas. 164 In addition to direct military training, the contras will receive $100 million 
in United States aid in 1987, and the President, hoping that United States aid to the 
contras will continue, has requested $105 million for 1988.165 
V. THE ILLEGALITY OF UNITED STATES INTERVENTION IN NICARAGUA 
This section will examine the legality of intervention in Nicaragua under two laws, 
the Neutrality Act, and the Boland Amendment to the House Appropriations Bill of 
1982 (the Boland Amendment). An analysis of these laws will show that the United 
States intervention in Nicaragua is illegal. 
A. United States Intervention in Nicaragua is Illegal Under the Neutrality Act 
In 1794, following the suggestion of President George Washington, Congress en-
acted the Neutrality Act in an attempt to better preserve "American relations with foreign 
powers with which it was at peace", and to prevent United States citizens from becoming 
embroiled in "entangling alliances and hostile conflicts with other nations."166 The text 
of the Act is as follows: 
Whoever, within the United States knowingly begins or sets on foot or provides 
or prepares a means for or furnishes money for or takes part in, any miltary or naval 
expedition or enterprise to be carried on from thence against the territory or 
dominion of any foreign prince or state, or of any colony, district, or people 
with whom the United States is at peace, shall be fined not more than $3,000 
or imprisoned not more than 3 years, or both. (emphasis added)167 
163 LeMoyne, With the Rebels in Nicaragua: Battle Ready, N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1987, at A8, col. 6. 
164 These two manuals are C.I.A., PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN GUERRILLA WARFARE (Cong. 
Research Service trans. 1984); THE FREEDOM FIGHTER'S MANUAL (1984). For a more complete 
discussion of these manuals, and of U.S. military training and support of the contras, see infra notes 
168, 243-255, and accompanying text. 
165 See Robinson, House Votes to Delay $40 million in Contra Aid, Boston Globe, Mar. 12, 1987, at 
AI, col. 6; Greenhouse, House in Vote to Block Funds for the Contras, N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1987, at 
AI, col. 5. 
166 United States v. Lumsden, 26 F. Cas. 1013, 1019 (DC Ohio, 1856), (No. 15641). Lumsden 
was a preliminary hearing in the case of Samuel Lumsden and 12 other Irish expatriates who were 
charged with planning a military expedition to Great Britain in violation of the Neutrality Act. Id. 
at 1014. See also Charge to Grand Jury-Neutrality Laws, 30 F. Cas. 1021, 1022 (CC Ohio, 1851) 
(No. 18267). 
There is an indication that President Washington saw the Neutrality Act as one of the most 
important laws that the United States could enact. On April 22, 1793, he issued a proclamation 
stating that it is "in the interest of the United States to conduct foreign policy impartially, with 
sincerity and good faith", and that a Neutrality Act was essential to "achieving that goal." Charge 
to Grand Jury-Neutrality Laws and Treason, 30 F. Cas. 1024, 1025 (CC Mass., 1851) (No. 18,269). 
In December 1793, Washington told both Houses of Congress that "where individuals shall, within 
the United States, enter upon military expeditions and enterprises the offense cannot receive too 
early or close an attention. "Id. 
167 18 U.S.c. § 960 (1982). The Supreme Court has held that the purpose of the Neutrality Act 
is, in general, to "secure neutrality in wars between two nations, or between contending parties 
recognized as belligerents .... " Wiborg v. United States, 16 S. Ct. 1127, 1133 (1896). (Wiborg and 
two others were accused of violating the Neutrality Act based on their positions as captains and 
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Based on the past mining of Nicaraguan ports, and the present financial and military 
assistance to the contras, the Neutrality Act prohibits U.S. intervention in Nicaragua. 168 
However, the Reagan Administration argues that the Act does not apply to this situ a-
mates, respectively, aboard the steamer Horsa, which ferried arms to men who intended to invade 
Cuba. The Court upheld the conviction of Wiborg, and reversed those of the mates.) [d. at 1138. 
In addition, a federal district judge in the 1850's, Judge Huntington, saw the Neutrality Act 
as a significant step in the development of man's morals: 
In the ages of barbarism, private war was tolerated. Physical power was the arbiter 
of right, and a dexterous use of the instruments of death was the prevailing logic. But 
this has been long since exploded among civilized nations .... Every government is 
responsible for the acts of its citizens. They must be restrained from violating the 
rights of other nations; and any government which has not the power or disposition 
to do this subjects itself to a declaration of war by the injured party. Charge to Grand 
Jury-Neutrality Laws, 30 F. Cas. 1020, 1021 (CC Ind., 1851)(No. 18,266). 
168 As discussed supra at notes 1 and 2, and accompanying text, this Note is concerned with 
domestic violations of United States law through the implementation of current Reagan Adminis-
tration policies in Nicaragua and EI Salvador. However, it is important at this point to discuss the 
judgement of the International Court of Justice in Nicaragua v. United States, supra note 8. 
In 1984, the Nicaraguan government sought an injunction from the International Court of 
Justice in an attempt to force the United States to stop the mining of Nicaraguan ports. In addition, 
Nicaragua filed suit at that time against the United States, seeking compensation for economic and 
property damage related to tne mining. See Nicar. v. U.S., 1984I.C.]. 169 (Request for the Indication 
of Provisional Measures of May 10), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 468, (May 1984). The United States then 
argued that the I.C.]. did not have jurisdiction to hear the case. The Court rejected that argument. 
Nicar. v. U.S., 1984 I.C.]. 392 (Jurisdiction and Admissibility Order of Nov. 26, 1984). Subsequently, 
on January 18, 1985, the United States, maintaining that the I.C.]. was without jurisdiction to hear 
the suit, withdrew from the proceedings. See Text of u.s. Statement in Withdrawal from the Case before 
the World Court, N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1984, at A4, col. 1. 
On June 27, 1986, the I.e.]. issued a communique containing the Judgment of the Court. 
I.C.]., Communique: Judgment of the Court in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua 
(Nicar. v. U.S.), June 27, 1986. The relevant portions of the decision are as follows: 
THE COURT: 
... (3) Decides that the United States of America, by training, arming, equipping, 
financing, and supplying the contra forces or otherwise encouraging, supporting and 
aiding military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua, has acted, against 
the Republic of Nicaragua, in breach of its obligation under customary international 
law not to interfere in the affairs of another state; ... 
(4) Decides that the United States of America, by certain attacks on Nicaraguan 
Territory in 1983-1984, namely attacks in Puerto Sandi no on 13 September and 14 
October 1983; an attack on Corinto on 16 October 1983; an attack on Potosi Naval 
Base on 4-5 January 1984; an attack on San Juan del Sur on 7 March 1984; attacks 
on border patrol boats at Puerto Sandino on 28 and 30 March 1984; and an attack 
on Sanjuan del Norte on 3 April 1984 ... has acted, against the Republic of Nicaragua, 
in breach of its obligation under customary international law not to use force against 
another state; ... 
(6) Decides that, by laying mines in the ... waters of the Republic of Nicaragua 
... the United States of America has acted, against the Republic of Nicaragua, in 
breach of its obligations under customary international law not to use force against 
another state, not to intervene in its affairs, not to violate its sovereignty and not to 
interrupt peaceful maritime commerce; ... 
(9) Finds that the United States of America, by producing in 1983 a manual 
entitled Psychological Guerrilla Warfare, and by disseminating it to the contra forces, 
has encouraged the commission by them of acts contrary to general principles of 
humanitarian law; ... 
(12) Decides that the United States of America is under a duty immediately to 
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tion. 169 Thus, this portion of the note is devoted to a phrase-by-phrase analysis of the 
relevant portions of the Neutrality Act and subsequent judicial opinions interpreting it. 
The statute begins with the word "whoever."17o President Reagan contends that 
"whoever" does not include high ranking members of the Executive branch, such as the 
President and his associates. I7I In addition, the Administration contends that the Presi-
dent's powers and duties as "commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy of the United 
States" override any such statutory limitations on his authority. I72 In support of the 
President's position, the Justice Department has prepared a memorandum noting that 
high ranking Administration officials are immune from prosecution under the Neutrality 
Act. 173 The memorandum reached the conclusion that the Act "is not applicable to the 
official conduct of the Executive Branch of Government."174 
The Judicial branch, however, has reached a different conclusion. Judicial decisions 
since 1806 have held that the Neutrality Act is applicable to the President and thus limits 
the scope of his activities in peacetime. In 1806, in United States v. Smith,175 two civilians 
were indicted and tried for aiding an attempt to launch an "expedition" against the 
"dominions of Spain in South America, the United States and Spain being at peace at 
the time." The defendants attempted to introduce evidence that their actions were 
sanctioned by President James Madison.I76 In ruling that the evidence was "wholly 
immaterial", Judge Tallmadge noted that "the previous knowledge or approbation of 
the President to the illegal acts of a citizen can afford him no justification for the breach 
of a constitutional law. The President's duty is to faithfully execute the laws, and [he] 
has no such dispensing power."I77 Similarly, in an earlier preliminary hearing relating 
to the same trial, Supreme Court Justice Paterson, sitting in the lower court by desig-
nation, noted: 
The President of the United States cannot control the Statute, nor 
dispense with its execution, and still less can authorize a person to do what 
the law forbids. If he could, it would render the execution of the laws 
cease and to refrain from all such acts as may constitute breaches of the foregoing 
legal obligations; ... 
(13) Decides that the United States of America is under an obligation to make 
reparation to the Republic of Nicaragua for all injury caused to Nicaragua by the 
breaches of obligations under customary international law enumerated above; ... 
Id. at 2-6. For a good critical discussion of all of the many aspects of the case and the decision, see 
Rowles, Nicaragua v. United States: Issues of Law and Policy, 20 INT'L LAWYER 1245 (1987). For an 
analysis of the United States rejection of ICJ jurisdiction in the case, see Ullman, World Court 
Evasion, N.V. Times, April II, 1984 at A7, col. 4. 
169 See generally, Dellums v. Smith, 577 F. Supp 1449 (N.D.Ca. 1984). See also, National Emer-
gency Civil Liberties Committee, Memorandum of the National Emergency Civil Liberties Com-
mittee on the United States, Nicaragua and the World Court, 6 (April 15, 1985). 
170 18 U.S.c. § 960 (1982). 
171 Dellums v. Smith, 577 F. Supp at 1452. 
172Id. at 1453. 
173 Off. Legal Counsel, Memorandum for Phillip B. Hetman re Applicability of the Neutrality 
Act to Activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, (Oct. 10, 1977) cited in Dellums at 1454. 
174Id. 
175 United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1233 (CC NY 1806)(No. 16,342a). See also, W. PACIUMA, 
INTERVENTION IN SPANISH FLORIDA 1801-1813: A STUDY IN JEFFERSONIAN FOREIGN POLICY, 290-91 
(1976); J. PRATT, EXPANSIONISTS OF 1812, 133 (1967). 
176 United States v. Smith, supra note 175, at 1234. 
177Id. at 1243. 
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dependent on his will and pleasure, which is a doctrine that has not been set 
up .... The law is paramount."178 
245 
Since Smith, the Neutrality Act has provided substantial protection against the Pres-
ident involving the United States in an undeclared war.179 In 1838, President Martin 
Van Buren spoke of the protections afforded by the Neutrality Act when he pointed 
out that "whether the interest or honor of the United States requires that they should 
be made a party to any such struggle, and by inevitable consequence to the war which 
is waged in its support, is a question which by our Constitution is wisely left to Congress 
alone to decide."180 In the same year, in charging the grand jury in a case concerning 
the Neutrality Act, Judge McLean noted that every citizen must obey the Act: 
An obedience to the laws is the first duty of every citizen .... If there 
be anyone line of policy in which all political parties agree, it is that we 
should keep aloof from the agitations of other governments. That we shall 
not intermingle our national concerns with theirs. And much more, that our 
citizens shall abstain from acts which lead the subjects of other governments 
to violence and bloodshed. 181 
Despite the Judicial and Presidential pronouncements to the contrary, some mem-
bers of Congress thought that the Neutrality Act unfairly limited the ability of the 
President to declare war. For example, Senator John Slidell introduced a resolution in 
1854 that would have allowed the President to suspend the operation of the Act when, 
"in his opinion, the public interest required it."182 When Sen. Slidell's proposed 1854 
amendment failed due to a lack of support among his colleagues, he proposed a similar 
amendment in 1858. That amendment would have permitted Presidential suspension of 
the Act during Congressional recesses. 183 That proposal also failed, and the Act remains 
the same today as when it was originally enacted in 1794. 184 
After Sen. Slidell's attempts to alter the scope of the original Neutrality Act in the 
1850's, Judge Shipman of the Northern District of New York noted in his 1866 Grand 
Jury charge concerning the Neutrality Act: 
Were individuals, however numerous or respectable, by whatever mo-
tives actuated, permitted, upon their own motion, to organize warlike enter-
178 United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1192 (CC NY 1806)(No. 16,342). This was a preliminary 
hearing on motions presented by 'both sides in F. Cas. 16,342a, including a defense motion to 
subpeona President Madison. Justice Paterson of the United States Supreme Court and a participant 
in the Constitutional Convention, presided over the hearing by designation. Other judges also have 
held specifically that the Neutrality Act applies to all citizens, regardless of government or social 
rank. See, e.g., Charge to Grand Jury-Neutrality Laws, 30 F. Cas. 1017, 1018 (CC NY 1866)(No. 
18,264). 
179 See generally, Lobel, The Rise and Decline of the Neutrality Act: Sovereignty and Congressional War 
Powers in United States Foreign Policy, 24 HARV. INT'L L.J., 31-33 (1983). See also, SOFAER, WAR, 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER, 315-16 (1976). 
180 President Martin Van Buren, Second Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 3, 1838), reprinted 
in 3 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 483, 487. See also, Inaugural Address of President 
John Adams (March 4, 1797), reprinted in 1 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS at 231. 
181Charge to Grand Jury-Neutrality Laws, 30 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (CC Ohio, 1838)(No. 18,265). 
182 CONGo GLOBE, 33d Cong., 1st Sess. 1021, 1023-24 (1854). 
183 CONGo GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 217, 462 (1858). 
184 The Neutrality Act that exists today is a March 4, 1909 reenactment of Act June 5, 1794 
§ 5, the original Neutrality Act. 
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prises in their native country, and engage in incursions into the territory of 
neighboring friendly nations, governments would no longer have control of 
the momentous questions of war and peace .... A country which should 
permit such a flagrant violation of its national obligations, would soon become 
a theatre from which hostile expeditions would issue .... The honor and 
dignity of the U.S .... demand that this act of congress [sic] shall be obeyed, 
or, if violated, that the offender shall be promptly punished. ISS 
More recently, courts have upheld the applicability of the Neutrality Act to actions 
of the President specifically, and to the Executive Branch in general. In January 1983, 
Congressman Richard Dellums sent a letter to Attorney General William French Smith 
containing detailed allegations about the United States activities in Nicaragua and against 
the Nicaraguan government. The letter indicated that at least several high level Admin-
istration members had violated the Neutrality Act. IS6 
The letter requested the Attorney General to conduct a preliminary investigation 
under the Ethics in Government Act lS7 to determine whether to apply for the appoint-
ment of independent counsel to investigate the activities of the officials. ISS In March 
1983, the Attorney General responded to Congressman Dellums' letter, but refused his 
request to appoint a special investigator. ls9 Dellums then went to court to force the 
Attorney General to conduct the requested investigation. 190 
In the resulting lawsuit, Dellums v. Smith, Congressman Dellums was joined by Myrna 
Cunningham, a physician and resident of Nicaragua who was kidnapped and raped by 
contra soldiers. He was also joined by Eleanor Ginsburg, a resident of Dade County, 
Florida, who asserted that contras were trained near her property by the U.S. Army, 
and as such presented a threat to her.191 The specific allegations were that the United 
States has: 
(1) provided at least $19 million as of 1981 to finance covert paramilitary 
operations against the people and property of Nicaragua; 
(2) financed the training of invasionary forces in the United States and 
Honduras, including former Somoza National Guardsman, and others; 
IS5 Charge to Grand Jury-Neutrality Laws, supra note 28, at 1018. 
186 Dellums v. Smith, 575 F. Supp. 1489 (N.D. Cal. 1983), motion to alter judgment denied, 
577 F. Supp. 1449 (N .D. Cal. 1984), 797 F. 2d 817 (7th Cir. 1986). 
187 Ethics in Government Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-598 (1986). The portions of Section 592 of the 
Ethics in Government Act relevant to this note state: 
(a)(l) Upon receiving information that the Attorney General determines is sufficient 
to constitute grounds to investigate that any person covered by this Act has engaged 
in [a violation of law], the Attorney General shall conduct ... a preliminary investi-
gation of the matter .... In determining whether grounds to investigate exist, the 
Attorney General shall consider: 
(A) the degree of specificity of the information received, and 
(B) the credibility of the source of the information .... 
(f) The Attorney General's determination under ... this section to apply to the division 
of the court for the appointment of [an] independent counsel shall not be reviewable 
in any court. [d. 
188 797 F.2d 817, 818. 
189 [d. 
190 [d. 
191 [d. at 818. 
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(3) conducted intelligence activities by the C.I.A. to determine specific targets 
for anti-Nicaraguan terrorist forces; 
(4) used Honduras as a base for invasionary forces; 
(5) supported Nicaraguan exiles based in the United States who in turn train 
and support invasionary forces on United States soil, and; 
(6) sent hundreds of C.I.A. officers and agents and other U.S. government 
agents to Honduras and Costa Rica to participate and assist in covert military 
operations against the people and government of Nicaragua. 192 
247 
The district court concluded that the plaintiffs had the necessary standing to seek 
a review of the Attorney General's action, and were thus entitled to summary judgment 
compelling the Attorney General to conduct the requested investigation of possible 
Neutrality Act and Boland Amendment violations by the Executive Branch. 193 The court 
concluded that the plaintiffs had met the three prong standing test set forth by the 
Supreme Court in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church 
and State. 194 In order to establish standing under the Valley Forge standard, a plaintiff 
must show: (1) that "he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a 
result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant;" (2) that "the injury 'fairly can 
be traced to the challenged action';" and (3) that the injury "is likely to be redressed by 
a favorable decision."195 
The court held that the first prong was satisfied by the refusal of the Attorney 
General to conduct a preliminary investigation. l96 The plaintiffs had a procedural right 
to have an investigation made if they provided specific information concerning the 
illegality of an Executive Branch official's actions. The denial of that right constituted 
an injury that is sufficient for standing. 197 
Curiously, the court ignored the second prong of the Valley Forge test, that the injury 
can by traced to the challenged action, and proceeded directly from the first factor of 
the test to an examination of the third, that the injury is "likely to be redressed by a 
favorable decision."198 However, after finding that the plaintiffs' injuries satisfied the 
third prong, the court bifurcated this prong into two further tests. 199 These two other 
tests, originally set out by the Supreme Court in Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights 
Organization, must both be satisfied if the court is to order the Attorney General to 
conduct a preliminary investigation. 20o A court could grant such relief if (1) the decision 
not to conduct a preliminary investigation is subject to judicial review and (2) if the 
remedy of mandamus to the Attorney General is permissible.201 The court held that 
both of these conditions were satisfied in Dellums.202 
The court held that because the Attorney General's decision not to conduct a 
preliminary investigation injured the plaintiffs' interests, the decision was subject to 
192 573 F. Supp. at 1482. 
193Id. at 1494-150l. 
194 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982). 
195 Dellums, 573 F. Supp. at 1494 (quoting Valley Forge, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1981)). 
1961d. at 1494-95. 
1971d. 
1981d. at 1497. 
1991d. 
2oold. (citing Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976)). 
201 ld. at 1498. 
202ld. 
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review under the Administrative Procedure Act (A.P.A.), satisfying the first prong of 
the Simons test. 203 Section 702 of the A.P.A. provides that "a person suffering a legal 
wrong because of agency action ... is entitled to judicial review thereof."204 
The court also found that the second prong of the Simon test was satisfied. "When 
the claim of a plaintiff is clear and the duty of an officer is ministerial, mandamus is 
traditionally the proper remedy."205 Thus, because both of the Simon tests, and all of the 
Valley Forge criteria were satisfied, the Dellurm court granted summary judgment for the 
plaintiffs.206 
The Attorney General subsequently filed a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend 
judgment, arguing that (1) the Justice Department had a policy of non-prosecution for 
violations of the Neutrality Act and (2) that the Act did not apply to expeditions autho-
rized by the President. 207 The district court disagreed, ruling that a policy of non-
prosecution of federal officials was not legitimate under the Ethics in Government Act. 208 
In addition, the court reviewed the language, legislative history, judicial and executive 
interpretations of the Neutrality Act and concluded that it prohibited even Presidentially-
sponsored expeditions against a government with whom the United States was at peace.209 
The motion to alter judgment was thus denied.2IO 
The Attorney General appealed the decision. 211 The appellate court held that the 
district court erred in exercising jurisdiction over the suit, because the three prong Valley 
Forge standing test was in fact not satisfied. 2I2 Specifically, the appellate court found that 
the plaintiffs "had not suffered an injury significant enough to satisfy the first prong of 
the test."213 Judicial creation of a procedural right, and the injury resulting from an 
infringement of that right was seen by the appellate court to "be too much."214 Judicial 
inference of Congressionally created procedural rights may be permissible, but not in 
the absence of compelling evidence that such a right is implied by the statutory language, 
statement of purpose, or legislative history of a statute.215 In this case, there was no 
evidence that Congress intended to allow the creation of a procedural right of review of 
the Attorney General's actions concerning the Ethics in Government Act.216 Thus an 
injury could not result from the breach of an alleged procedural right, because that 
203 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1985). See, e.g., id. at 1498. 
204 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1985). In addition, the court found that the Attorney General is an "agency" 
subject to review under the A.P.A., relying on Proietti v. Levi, 530 F.2d 836, 838 (9th Cir. 1976). 
It also held that "agency action" includes a failure to act, citing City of Chicago v. United States, 
396 U.S. 162, 166-67. See Dellums, 573 F. Supp. at 1498. 
205 [d. at 1500, citing Elliot v. Weinberger, 564 F.2d 1219, 1226 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd in part 
on other grounds, 442 U.S. 682 (1979). 
206 [d. at 1505. 
207 577 F. Supp. at 1454. Rule 59(e) states that: "[aJ motion to alter or amend the judgment 
shall be served not later than 10 days after the entry of the judgment." FED. R. CIV. P. 59 (e). 
208 577 F. Supp. at 1454. 
209 [d. at 1452-54. 
210 [d. 
211 Dellums v. Smith, 797 F.2d 817 (1986). 
212 [d. at 821. 
213 [d. 
214 [d. 
215 !d. at 821-23. 
216 !d. 
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procedural right did not in fact exist.2I7 Furthermore, since Congress precluded private 
citizens from seeking review under the Ethics in Government Act, plaintiffs Cunningham 
and Ginsburg also lacked standing to bring suit against the Attorney General for his 
failure to investigate their charges.218 Thus, because members of Congress lack the 
standing necessary to seek review of the Attorney General's refusal to act, and because 
his refusal is not reviewable at the behest of the public, the district court decisions were 
reversed on procedural grounds.219 
The appellate court was emphatic, however, in noting that it did not reach the merits 
of the district court's ruling concerning the Neutrality Act. 220 In fact, the court suggested 
that members of the Judiciary Committee might have the standing necessary to challenge 
the Attorney General's decision when it noted that " ... enforcement by members of 
congressional judiciary committees would be effective in preventing the Attorney General 
from refusing to obey the law."221 
The impact of the Dellums decision upon the applicability of the Neutrality Act to 
the actions of the President is uncertain due to the reversal of Dellums by the appellate 
court.222 However, because the appellate court did not overturn the reasoning of the 
district court regarding the rule 59(e) decision, it seems that the appellate court concurs 
with the district court's view that the Neutrality Act is applicable to the President. 
Furthermore, it is unlikely that the appeals court would overrule 180 years of consistent 
judicial interpretation without issuing a lengthy, well-reasoned opinion. 
Congress is uncertain about the impact of the Dellums reversal. Consequently, eleven 
members of the Judiciary Committee have submitted a new request to the Attorney 
General for a special prosecutor under the Ethics in Government Act.223 A Dellums-type 
suit is likely if the Attorney General refuses to grant the request. 224 Since there is a 
likelihood of further legal action and Congressional debate on the applicability of the 
Neutrality Act to the actions of the President and other Executive Branch officials, it is 
important to evaluate other key phrases of the Act to determine whether or not they 
are applicable to current United States involvement in Nicaragua. 
The second significant phrase of the Neutrality Act is "within the United States."225 
It has been argued that since contra aid is provided in Nicaragua, it is not covered by 
the Neutrality Act because it is not "within the United States." This argument is without 
merit. 
First, there is substantial evidence that the Administration, through the Army and 
the C.I.A., trains contras on military bases in the United StateS.226 Contra leaders227, the 
217Id. 
218Id. at 822-23. 
219Id. at 823. 
22°Id. at 820. 
221/d. at 823. 
222 Riley, Controversy Looms on Enforcement: Neutrality Act Violoted in Nicaragua?, Nat'l L. J. Nov. 
3, 1986, at A3, col. 3. 
223Id. 
22. Id. 
225 18 U.S.C. § 960 (1983). 
226 LeMoyne, First Group ofContras Completes Flo Training, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1987, at AlD, col. 
1. See also, LeMoyne, supra note 163. 
227Id. See also, EICH & RINCON, supra note 150, at 2-3. 
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International Court of Justice,228 and the Reagan Administration229 have all expressly 
substantiated this belief.230 
The contra training is comprehensive. They are taught basic military tactics, map 
reading, weapons use, and command techniques for twelve hours a day under the 
supervision of American military trainers.m According to Aristides Sanchez, the contra 
leader in charge of logistics, in addition to the basic military skills, the training includes 
specialized courses in the use of explosives and anti-aircraft missiles, and intelligence 
and psychological warfare.232 
The Administration has down played the importance of the secret contra training 
camps by saying that the contras are trained in "small" groups of 60-200 soldiers each.m 
They argue that since the contra soldiers are not being trained en masse on United States 
soil, their military training is permissible. However, although the contras are trained in 
small groups, over the years the numbers accumulate. An estimated 700 contra troops 
will be trained in the U.S. this year alone.234 However, even if that estimate were incorrect, 
and only a small number of contras were actually trained on U.S. soil, the Act would 
still apply. Even if only small numbers of contras are trained in the U.S., the Act is not 
circumvented. 
The Neutrality Act applies even if only a small group of contras actually train in 
the United States with the Armed Forces.m Moreover, the Act applies even if only the 
organizer of the prohibited aid, here President Reagan, is "within the United States."236 
It was noted in Jacobsen v. United States that "it is sufficient to prove a violation of the 
Neutrality Act to show that the plan was made here, and that funds were collected in 
this country for carrying it OUt."237 Clearly that is what is taking place with respect to the 
contras. The plans have been made in the United States.23B The funds are also collected 
here.239 Simply put, contra aid provided by the United States meets, and violates, the 
"within the U.S." language of the Neutrality Act. 
The third phrase in the Neutrality Act to be examined here is " ... begins or sets 
on foot or provides or prepares for or furnishes the money for, or takes part in, any 
228 See, ICJ Communique, supra note 168, at page 2, count 3. 
229 Treaster, Secrecy on Contras' Training SetsQJf Dispute, N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1987, at A14, col. 
1. 
230 It is widely believed that the training takes place at either Eglin Air Force Base in Florida, 
or at Forts Benning & Stewart in Georgia. Id. 
231 See LeMoyne, supra note 163. 
mId. See also, Palmer, Witness Says C.I.A. Trained Contras During Ban on Aid, Boston Globe, Mar. 
24, 1987, at AI, col. 3. 
233Id. 
234 LeMoyne, supra note 163. 
235 "It is not necessary that all of the persons composing the military enterprise shall be brought 
into personal contact with each other within the limits of the United States." United States v. 
Murphy, 84 F. 609 (DC Del. 1898). (The defendant was charged with violating the Neutrality Act 
based on his part in planning a military expedition to Spanish Cuba while the United States was at 
peace with Spain. Defendant was convicted, and that conviction was upheld.) 
236 Jacobsen v. United States, 272 F. 399 (CA III. 1920). (Defendant, a German national, was 
accused of organizing an insurrection in India that would discredit Great Britain during World 
War I, using Chicago as his headquarters). 
mId. at 400-02. 
238 See infra notes 247-48, 250-56. 
239 See infra notes 245-46. 
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military or naval expedition or enterprise .... "240 This phrase has been construed 
broadly by courts, so as not to be limited to the direct and overt invasion of a country 
"with which the United States is at peace."241 The Act covers "taking the incipient steps 
in the enterprise. [It means] to provide the means for the expedition, as the enlistment 
of men, the munitions of war, money, in short, anything and everything that is necessary 
to the commencement and prosecution of the enterprise."242 
The United States is currently engaging in activities of that sort in Nicaragua. In 
fact, the United States exercises "direction and control at every level of the contras' 
activities, from the most minute details of the behavior and performance of individuals, 
to the broadest issues of deciding what goals to pursue, and how best to achieve them."243 
This aid continues despite the fact that the Administration, through Assistant Secretary 
of State Elliot Abrams, has indicated that C.I.A. aid to the contras may violate the 
Neutrality Act.244 Simply put, the Administration funds the contras. The latest appro-
priations bill, signed into law by President Reagan on October 24, 1986, provides $100 
million in aid for 1987, and the administration is said to be seeking an additional $105 
million in aid for 1988.245 In addition, it has been revealed that the United States paid 
$276,186 for a contra public relations drive, which included the lobbying of Senators 
and Congressmen.246 
At the command level, the United States government carefully chooses the contra 
leaders, and dismisses those that displease it.247 For example, in December, 1982, the 
State Department decided that the contras needed new leadership.248 The Administration 
subsequently interviewed candidates, selected the new leaders, and presented them to 
the American public at a Miami press conference.249 
240 18 U.S.C. § 960 (1985). 
241 Charge to Grand Jury-Neutrality Laws, 30 F. Cas. 1020, 1021 (DC Ind., 1851)(No. 18,266). 
242 Furthermore, a "military expedition" as defined by courts covers not only direct aid by the 
United States, but also the acts of a U.S.-aided group like the contras. Groups of individuals "need 
not comprise a highly trained military organization in order to fall within the phrase military 
expedition or enterprise." United States v. Tauscher, 233 F. 597, 600 (DC NY, 1916). Any group 
with a "preconcerted plan of operations, with leadership, and a coordination of men, supplies and 
munitions ... is a military expedition within the terms of the statute." Id. 
243 Bernheim, United States Armed Intervention in Nicaragua and Article 2 (4) of the United Nations 
Charter, 11 YALE]. INT'L L. 104, 120 (1985). 
244 PRESIDENT's SPECIAL REVIEW BOARD, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL REVIEW BOARD, 
Feb. 26, 1987, B-125 (hereinafter TOWER COMMISSION REpORT); C.I.A. Sends the Contras a New Battle 
Plan, N.Y. Times, Mar. 22, 1987, at E2, col. 1. 
245 See supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
246 See State Dept. Said to Pay $276,186 for Contra Public Relations Drive, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7,1987, 
at A4, col. 5. 
247 See generally, LeMoyne, Cruz, Contra Leader Who Quit, Says Aim is to Force Changes, N.Y. Times, 
Mar. 11, 1987, at AI, col. 4; The Contras Shake-Up, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1987, at AI, col. 3; Top 
Contra Quits, Saying March 10, 1987 Changes Were Blocked, N.Y. Times, at AI, col. 3; Greenhouse, 
Cruz Resignation: Effect Disputed, N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1987, at AI, col. 3; Dibble & Chardy, Key 
Contra Leader Quits U.S.-Backed Rebel Organization, Boston Globe, Mar. 10, 1987, at A8, col. 4; 
Treaster, Leading Contra Quits Alliance Amid Disputes, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1987, at AI, col. 5; Contra 
Controversy, Wash. Post, Nov. 27, 1984, at A14, col. 4; Sciolono, Contras Won't Change, NEWSWEEK, 
April 13, 1987; Bernheim, supra note 229, at 120-25. 
248 It was time to "repackage the leadership." See Wall St.]., Mar. 5, 1985, at AI, col. 1. 
2491d. Concerning the contra leadership, former contra leader Edgar Chamorro has stated that 
"[t]hose Nicaraguans who were chosen [by the C.I.A.] for leadership positions within the organi-
zation ... were those who best demonstraten their willingness to unquestioningly follow the instruc-
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The United States government, through the Armed Forces and the C.I.A., also 
supports the contras at the operational and tactical level, instructing and directing the 
contras' training.250 The C.I.A. has written two manuals for the contras, The Freedom 
Fighter's Manual, and Operaciones Sicologicas en Guerra de Guerrillas (Psychological Warfare 
Manual).251 These manuals contain advice on the use of weapons, psychological warfare, 
and terrorist tactics.252 The extent of C.I.A. control of the contras is best expressed in 
former contra leader Edgar Chamorro's testimony before the International Court of 
Justice: 
[When I joined ... the contras], I hoped that it would be an organization 
of Nicaraguans, controlled by Nicaraguans, and dedicated to our own objec-
tives which we ourselves would determine. I joined on the understanding 
that the United States Government would supply us [with] the means nec-
essary to defeat the Sandinistas and replace them as a government .... [The 
contras] turned out to be an instrument of the United States Government, 
and specifically the C.I.A. It was created by the C.I.A., it was supplied, 
equipped, armed and trained by the C.I.A ..... [I]ts activities-both political 
and military-[are] directed and controlled by the C.I.A.253 
In addition to providing tactical and training assistance to the contras, the U.S. also 
supplies arms to the contras, with the most recent shipment consisting of AK-47 rifles, 
grenade launchers, M-60 machine guns, anti-tank rockets, mortars, and shoulder-fired 
SAM missles.254 In short, the United States provides the contras with both the "means 
for the expedition" and "anything else necessary to the commencement and prosecution 
of enterprise",255 and that violates the Neutrality Act. A high-ranking member of the 
contras, Jorge Ramirez Zelaya noted that "[we are] kept functional by the financial and 
military support of the U.S. government. Every revolution is supported by a foreign 
power. [We are supported] with comprehensive financial aid, with weapons, and with 
tions of the C.I.A. They, like the organization itself, became nothing more than executioners of the 
C.I.A.'s orders." Deposition of Edgar Chamorro before the International Court of Justice, Sept. 5, 
1985 in P. ROSSET & J. VANDERMEER, supra note 7 at 246. 
250 See ICJ Communique, supra note 154; LeMoyne, C.I.A. Said to Guide Contras' Military Despite 
Ban on Aid, N.Y. Times, Jan. II, 1987, at AI, col. I; Palmer, Crewmen Say C.I.A. Aided Contra Airlift, 
Boston Globe, Mar. II, 1987, at AI, col. 3; TOWER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 244, at CI0-
14; She non, Grand Jurors Said to Explore Wide u.S. Role in Nicaragua, N.Y. Times, Mar. 30,1987, at 
A6, col. 3; Brinkley, C.I.A. Gives Contras Detailed Profiles of Civil Targets: Raids Planned in Spring, N.Y. 
Times, Mar. 18, 1987, at AI, col. I; Palmer, supra note 232; Bennett, Contras Girdfor Spring Offensive, 
Boston Globe, Mar. 29, 1987, at A22, col. 3. 
251 These manuals have since been published in paperback form in the United States. See J. 
OMANG & A. NEIER, THE C.I.A.'s NICARAGUA MANUAL: PSYCHOLGICAL OPERATIONS IN GUERRILLA 
WARFARE, (1985); THE FREEDOM FIGHTER'S MANUAL (1985). 
252 See supra note 164; ICJ Communique supra note 168, at 4, count 9. The C.I.A. publications 
advocated the use of murder, kidnapping, robbery and torture, "explicit and implicit terror" against 
the Sandinistas and surrounding civilian populations. See, Affidavit of Edgar Chamorro, supra note 
249, at 244-245. The C.I.A. is reportedly still teaching psychological warfare to the contras. See 
Brinkley, supra note 250, at A 10, col. 3. 
253 Affidavit of Edgar Chamorro, supra note 249, at 245. In addition, one of the aides to former 
C.I.A. Director William Casey stated in 1982 that the C.I.A. had "firm control" over the contra 
operation, and that it was "Casey's war." See Wash. Post, Dec. 16, 1984, at A I, col. I; Wash. Post, 
May 8, 1983, at A II, col. 1. 
254 LeMoyne, supra note 163, at A8, col. 5-6. 
255 See Charge to Grand Jury-Neutrality Laws, supra note 60. 
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war materiel, in sufficient quantities since 1982. This support is channeled through the 
C.I.A .. "256 
The last phrase of the Neutrality Act to be analyzed in this note is "with whom the 
United States is at peace." The Reagan Administration has argued that the Act does not 
apply to the situation in Nicaragua because the United States is not "at peace" with that 
country.257 The Administration maintains that the "continued state of paramilitary activ-
ities has destroyed the state of peace which had existed between the two countries."258 
This argument fails on constitutional grounds. 
Under Article I, section 8 of the Constitution, only Congress has the power to 
declare war.259 Congress has failed to declare war against Nicaragua, and the United 
States has not been invaded by Nicaragua so as to render that declaration unnecessary 
under the Neutrality Act. Courts dealing with the Neutrality Act have reiterated this 
concept. In United States v. Smith, Judge Tallmadge noted that "the United States cannot 
be constitutionally at war but when war is authorised by congress [sic], or is rendered 
an act of necessity by the invasion of a foreign enemy."260 The United States remains 
officially at peace with Nicaragua.261 In addition, the United States government recog-
nizes the present government of Nicaragua in a diplomatic sense, and the two countries 
maintain full diplomatic relations. This fact, when coupled with the paramilitary and 
military activities described above, shows that the Neutrality Act is being violated by the 
United States government in Nicaragua. 
It is unclear what remedy should be undertaken to satisfy the provisions of the 
Neutrality Act. The Act itself requires that violators be fined and imprisoned.262 It does 
not, however, explicitly require that the illegal aid be stopped. So, while it is clear that 
the Neutrality Act applies to individuals assisting in U.S. aid to the contras in Nicaragua, 
it is necessary to examine other domestic statutes that would actually force violators to 
stop any proscribed aid being given illegally to the contras. 
256 EICH & RINCON, supra note 150, at 39. Another contra leader, Orlando Wayland, noted that 
the "olive green helicopter from the gringos landed on a small slope at the camp and brought 
weapons and uniforms." [d. at 128. See also, Rosenbaum, Casey is Termed the Mastermind of Efforts to 
Resupply the Contras, N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1987, at AI, col. 5; McManus, Casey Directed North, Rebel 
Aid, Sources Say, Boston Globe, Mar. 28, 1987, at AI, col. 1. 
257 Dellums supra note 186, F. Supp. 877, at 1454. 
258 [d. 
259 Article I, § 8, the clause of the Constitution relevant here, states that: 
Congress shall have the power: 
To declare war ... ; 
To raise and support Armies ... ; 
To provide and maintain a Navy ... ; 
To make rules for the Government and Regulation of the Land and naval forces ... ; 
To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress 
insurrections and repel invasions; 
To provide for organization, arming and disciplining the militia, and for governing 
such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States .... 
260 United States v. Smith, supra note 175, at 1243. 
261 In fact, there is still a binding treaty of friendship between the two countries, The Treaty 
of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States of America and the Republic 
of Nicaragua signed at Managua, Nicaragua on January 21, 1956. See ICJ Communique, supra note 
168,at4. 
262 See supra note 167 and accompanying text. 
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B. United States Intervention in Nicaragua is Illegal Under the Boland Amendment 
On December 21, 1982 Congress enacted the Boland Amendment to the House 
Appropriations Bill of 1982.263 This amendment, which was intended to bar any military 
or economic aid to the contras, reads as follows: 
None of the funds provided in the Act may be used by the Central 
Intelligence Agency or the Department of Defense to furnish military equip-
ment, military training or advice, or other support for military activities, to 
any group or individual, not part of a country's armed forces,for the purpose 
of overthrowing the Government of Nicaragua or provoking a military ex-
change between Nicaragua and Honduras. (emphasis added)264 
The passage of the Boland Amendment created a ban on military aid to Nicaragua 
that lasted from December 31, 1982 until October 23, 1986.265 Any aid proscribed by 
the statute that was given during that period would violate the law.266 However, the 
Reagan Administration indicated soon after the passage of the Boland Amendment that 
it might not be able to avoid violating it. In fact, the House Permanent Select Committee 
on Intelligence, which oversees the covert activities against Nicaragua, reported in 1983 
that it was unwilling to assure the House that the Administration could meet the terms 
of the Boland Amendment. 267 ' 
In order for the Boland Amendment to apply to United States aid that has been 
given to the contras, that aid must have been given for the purpose of "overthrowing 
the Government of Nicaragua."268 Evidence indicates that such, an overthrow is in fact 
the goal of Administration policy. The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelli-
gence found that "the purpose and the mission of the [contra] operation is to overthrow 
the government in Nicaragua."269 In addition, President Reagan has personally indicated 
his desire to overthrow the Nicaraguan government. During a February 21, 1985 press 
conference, the President was asked whether the removal of the Sandinista government 
was a goal of his policy. He replied, "Well, remove in the sense of its present structure."270 
When asked U[A]ren't you advocating the overthrow of the present government?," the 
President replied, "Not if the present government would turn around and say, all right, 
if they'd say 'Uncle."'271 
Thus, because it seems as a threshold matter that the United States aid to the contras 
is intended to help overthrow the government of Nicaragua, the Boland Amendment is 
applicable to that aid. The Administration has violated the Boland Amendment in three 
separate ways, through: (1) the conversion of allowable non-lethal humanitarian aid into 
263 Pub. L. 97-377 § 793, 96 Stat. 1865 (1982). 
264Id. 
265 Gelb, Contra Aid: Who Are the Planners?, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1986, at A3, col. 1. See also, 
SEN. KERRY, "PRIVATE ASSISTANCE" AND THE CONTRAS: A STAFF REPORT, 2, Oct. 14, 1986. 
266 Pertman, Records Link Iran Receipts to Contras, Boston Globe, Apr. 24, 1987, at AI, col. 1; 
Butterfield, Contra Supplies Reportedly Got U.S. Military Help, N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 1987, at AI, col. 
6. 
267 See Lobel & Rantner, supra note 45, at 40. 
268 Pub. L. 97-377, § 793, 96 Stat. 1865 (1982). 
269 129 CONGo REc. H5748 (daily ed. July 27, 1983). 
270 See President's News Conference supra note 160, at 212. 
271Id. at 212-13. 
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lethal supplies, (2) offical aid given covertly during the period the Boland Amendment 
was in effect, and (3) the unofficial sponsoring of contra aid while it was banned, through 
the establishment of a "private" aid network, the latter two being part of the so-called 
"Iran-contra affair."272 
First, during the period that the Boland Amendment was in effect, Congress, 
alarmed by the lack of, for example, medical supplies in Nicaragua, authorized $27 
million in non-lethal aid for the contras.273 Despite the fact that the aid was intended 
for items such as a medical evacuation helicopter and trucks, it now seems that at least 
part of this non-lethal humanitarian aid was converted into lethal supplies.274 Of the $27 
million in non-lethal aid that was authorized by Congress, approximately one-half was 
actually used for such aid, and the rest cannot be accounted for.275 False vouchers 
allegedly have been submitted indicating that the money was spent on food and clothing. 
Moreover, documentation exists showing that, for example, at least $15 thousand in 
humanitarian aid was used to buy bullets.276 The State Department also solicited $10 
million in non-lethal aid from the Sultan of Brunei, and that money has now disap-
peared.277 The Administration ,cannot account for it, though some Congressional inves-
tigators believe that it is possible that the money was used for non-humanitarian aid, in 
violation of the Boland Amendment.278 
272 See generally, Rosenbaum, Secord Says High Officials Helped Him Supply Contras Despite Ban on 
U.S. Arms Aid, N.¥. Times, May 6, 1987, at AI, col. 6; Secord Recounts Being Told Reagan Knew of 
His Work, N.¥. Times, May 7, 1987, at AI, col. 6; Pertman, Boland Grills Secord on "Little" Amendment, 
Boston Globe, May 9, 1987, at A4, col. 4; Butterfield, Aide Tells How He and North Anned the Contras, 
N.Y. Times, May 20,1987, at AI, col. 3. 
It is interesting to note that President Reagan feels that the Boland Amendment is not applicable 
to the actions of the President. See, Reagan Says He Did Not Violate Contra-Aid Ban: Believes Boland 
Measure Does Not Apply to Him, Toledo Blade, May 17, 1987, at AI, col. 5. This is similar to his view 
that the Neutrality Act is inapplicable to the actions of the President concerning the aid to the 
contras. See supra notes 170-222 and accompanying text. The joint congressional committee inves-
tigates the Iran-contra affair has noted the attitude of the Reagan Administration concerning the 
Boland Amendment was one in which "[o]fficials viewed the law not as a boundary for their actions 
but as an impediment to their goals. When the goals and law collided, the law gave way." Shenon, 
Reagan Backed 'Inverted Values,' Iran Panel Says in Tougher Draft, N.¥. Times, Oct. 25, 1987, at AI, 
col. 3. 
273 LeMoyne, supra note 163; TOWER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 244, at C6. 
274 Id., see also, Engelberg, Report Says U.S. Lost Track of Sultan's Cash, N.Y. Times, January 7, 
1987, at AI, col. 3; Ex-Crewman Says C.I.A. Delivered Explosives to Contras, Boston Globe, April 3, 
1987, at A17, col. 3. 
275 The House of Representatives, alarmed at the apparent mi~appropriation of funds, has 
indicated that it will not approve additional contra funding until a full accounting is made of all 
missing funds. See supra note 165. See also, Gerth, Cash for Contras Far Exceeds Sum They Had Thought, 
N.Y. Times, April 8, 1987; Millions Raisedfor Contras Missing, Boston Globe, April 9, 1987, at AlO, 
col. 4. In addition, some Congressmen suspect that illegal drug sales may have been part of the 
Iran-Contra affair. Kurkjian, U.S. Probing Drug Links to C.I.A. Flights, Boston Globe, April 26, 1987, 
at AI, col 6. 
276 Reagan Certifies that Contras can get U.S. Aid; Reforms Cited, Boston Globe, Oct. 25, 1986, at 
A6, col. 4. 
277 See Engelberg, supra note 274; TOWER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 244, at BI23-26. See 
generally supra note 165. 
278 See Engelberg, supra note 274; Kranish, U.S. Solicitations for Contras Cited, Boston Globe, Mar. 
6, 1987, at AI, col. 6. 
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The second way in which the Administration has violated the Boland Amendment 
has been revealed through the ever-broadening scope of the "Iran-contra affair."279 The 
affair, at its most basic level, seems to have involved two steps: the U.S. government sold 
arms to Iran and the money was deposited into Swiss bank accounts.280 Then, the money 
was withdrawn and used to pay the Defense Department for the arms, with the excess 
money, or profit, going to the contras.281 Even though the Boland Amendment was 
effectively repealed by the passage of a new contra appropriations bill for $100 million 
dollars in aid on October 23, 1986, the Administration still violated U.S. laws by aiding 
the contras, because the events of the "affair" allegedly took place during the time in 
which the Amendment was in effect. 2H2 
By the fall of 1985, Lt. Col. Oliver North was actively engaged in resupplying the 
contras with lethal weapons. 283 He obtained elaborate encryption devices from the Na-
tional Security Council (NSC) and "established a communications network between him-
self, the contras, the NSC, and private aid groups outside the purview of Congress."284 
279 See generally, TOWER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 244, at III 19-24, IV 5-10, BI21-127, 
CI-17. 
280 Id. 
281 Id. 
282 The new aid package was passed on Oct. 23, 1986, after President Reagan certified that the 
contras are making human rights reforms. The aid package consisted of $70 million in military aid 
and $30 million in non-lethal aid. $60 million was to be provided immediately, the other $40 million 
was to be awarded in Spring 1987, contingent upon Congressional approval. See Reagan Certifies 
that Contras can get U.S. Aid; Reforms Cited, supra note 276. 
It is important to note here that, much like the human rights certifications in EI Salvador, 
discussed supra at notes 79-113 and accompanying text, those that the President makes to Congress 
concerning the contras are grossly inadequate. The contras are engaging in gross violations of 
human rights. However, because the aid is not to a "government," the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961, discussed supra at notes 76-116, is not applicable to the situation in Nicaragua. For an analysis 
of human rights abuses by the contras in Nicaragua, including the rape, murder, torture and forced 
relocation of civilians, see EICH & RINCON, supra note 150, at 12, 38, 64-65, 126; Kinzer, Contras 
Raid Civilian Targets, N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1987, at AI, col. 5; Sciolino, U.S. Group Finds No 
Improvement in Contras' Human Rights Record, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1987, at AI0, col. 2; LAWYER'S 
COMMITTEE FOR INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, COMMENTS ON THE NICARAGUAN GOVERNMENT'S 
REPORT TO THE U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, (1983); Brinkley, supra note 250, at AI0, col. 3; 
Aleman, Nicaragua Says Rebels Killed 6 in 4 Raids, Boston Globe, Mar. 22, 1987, at AI0, col. 6; 
Bennett, Conflict Hits Civilians Hard in Nicaragua, Boston Globe, Mar. 27, 1987, at AI, col. 4; R. 
BRODY, CONTRA TERROR IN NICARAGUA: REPORT OF A FACT-FINDING MISSION (1985); T. CABESTRERO, 
BLOOD OF THE INNOCENT: VICTIMS OF THE CONTRAS' WAR IN NICARAGUA (1985). 
On April 28, 1987, the U.S.-backed contras murdered an American Engineer, Benjamin Linder, 
who was doing volunteer work in Nicaragua. Hirshson & Gaines, Among Slain Engineer's Friends, 
Anger at U.S. Role in Nicaragua, Boston Globe, April 30, 1987, at AI, col. 4; Kinzer, American Died 
in Rebel Ambush, Nicaragua Says, N.Y. Times, April 30, 1987, at A12, col. 2; Sciolino, U.S. Agencies 
Lay Blame for Volunteer's Death on Administration, N.Y. Times, April 30, 1987, at A12, col. 2; Path to 
Nicaragua and Death, N.Y. Times, April 30, 1987, at A12, col. 2. 
When the latest contra aid package of $100 million was approved by Congress in 1986, an 
important "string" was attached: $3 million would have to be used to insure that the contras showed 
a more enlightened attitude toward human rights. The Reagan Administration asked the Association 
for Human Rights to monitor the contras. In a report released July 30, 1987, the group noted 
abuses ranging from the murder of civilians and prisoners to the burning of a church health clinic. 
A State Department spokesman said the number of "breaches" was "rather small for the time 
period." Report Describes Contra Violations, N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1987, at E2, col. 2. 
283 TOWER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 244, at C7. 
284 [d. at C7-8. 
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Using this system, North coordinated at least nine shipments of munitions to the contras 
from March to June 1986.285 
In the summer of 1986, North organized a new contra management structure called 
Project Democracy (PRODEM), a network of secret bank accounts and individuals 
"deeply involved in contra resupply activities-including the building of a secret airstrip 
for use by the contras in northern Costa Rica."286 At one point, the assets of PROD EM 
included six aircraft, warehouses, supplies, maintenance facilities, ships, leased houses, 
vehicles, munitions, communications equipment, and the airstrip in Costa Rica. PRO-
DEM's assets were worth over $4.5 million.287 In short, North coordinated a wide variety 
of contra aid activities during the time that the Boland Amendment was in effect. The 
commission of any of these activities would be enough to violate the Boland Amendment. 
In addition to the government's role in "actively" resupplying the contras, the NSC 
and North significantly assisted private contra aid groups.288 The Tower Commission, 
the Presidential Panel investigating the affair, found that the NSC in general, and 
specifically Lt. Col. North, actively aided private groups that were supporting the contras 
in two areas: operations and fundraising. 289 He solicited materiel such as helicopters 
from U.S. allies, and provided military advice to contra leaders during the period in 
which the Boland Amendment was in effect.290 He actively solicited monetary aid for 
the contras from third party countries.29' He arranged for shipments of munitions to 
the contras via third party countries, disguising the flow of arms from the United 
States.292 North also set up an elaborate network of shell and tax-exempt corporations 
to disguise the flow of arms.293 A Washington lobbyist and fund raiser, Carl Channell, 
pleaded guilty to a charge of fraud relating to his role in setting up the tax-exempt 
funds with North.294 Channell admits raising $2 million for humanitarian aid during the 
time the Boland Amendment was in effect, and then, with North's assistance, using it to 
purchase military supplies for the contras.295 This is the first criminal prosecution re-
sulting from the Iran-contra affair. 296 
Moreover, in addition to the private assistance network established by the NSC and 
North, the Administration violated the Boland Amendment by aiding other private 
groups supplying arms to the contras. These groups, like those that North established, 
formed when official U.S. aid to the contras was cut off by the Boland Amendment. As 
one Administration official said, the U.S. government helped the system "readjust" by 
285Id. at C8. For a photographic essay of the covert resupply mission, see Palmer, Contra Aid 
Scrapbook, Boston Globe, Mar. 29, 1987, at A24, coil. 
286Id. at Cll. 
287Id. 
288Id. 
289 TOWER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 244, at C2; Kranish, North's Contra Funds Offered Tax 
Breaks to Donors, Boston Globe, Mar. 29, 1987, at AI, col. 2. 
290 TOWER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 244. 
291Id. at C4-S. 
292Id. 
293Id. The complex network of private citizens and shell corporations was traced by Lt. Col. 
North in an elaborate diagram. Id. at CIS-I6. 
294 Kranish, Fund-Raiser Pleads Guilty on Contra Aid: Implicates North in Conspiracy, Boston Globe, 
April 30, 1987, at AI, col. 6. 
295 Berke, Key Figure Admits Fraud Conspiracy on Contra Funds, N.Y. Times, April 30, 1987 at AI, 
col. 1. 
296Id. 
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doing three things: devising a plan to get aid to the contras, "helping to open the doors 
and gather the funds," and keeping up contact with the contras.297 Another official noted 
that "White House and Pentagon officials had been instrumental in advising the various 
private efforts to arm the contras."298 Congressional investigators also "have clear indi-
cations" that former C.I.A. director William Casey and other C.I.A. officers coordinated 
the Reagan Administration's efforts to assist the contras in obtaining military, or lethal 
aid, through private groups in foreign countries during the time the Boland Amendment 
was in effect.299 
Attention began to focus on the activities of the private groups when a Southern 
Air Transport plane was shot down in Nicaragua on October 7, 1986.300 The plane, 
carrying Eugene Hasenfus, William Cooper and two contra soldiers, was shot down by 
the Sandinistas when it attempted to drop guns and ammunition to the contras. 301 
President Reagan, defending the actions of Hasenfus and Cooper, noted that "[ w ]e're 
in a free country where private citizens have a great many freedoms", and that the flight 
was "quite in line with what has been a pretty well-established tradition in our country" 
and furthermore that he would "not be inclined to interfere."302 
Circumstantial evidence indicates that this group had at least the "tacit approval of 
the U.S. government."303 First, the company that provided the plane, Southern Air 
Transport, has close ties with the C.I.A .. 304 Second, the plane took off from the Iiopango 
air base in El Salvador, which is financed totally by the United States, and the U.S. 
frequently uses it as a staging base for contra missions.30s Third, Hasenfus has since 
admitted that the C.I.A. supervised the missions that he flew into Nicaragua, and further 
indicated that the flight was connected to an agency said to be providing only non-lethal 
aid.306 Finally, it has been revealed that the crewmen involved in the operation, including 
the pilot William Cooper, were required to sign a "secrecy agreement" stating that they 
had been exposed to classified information and were responsible to the United States 
297 Gelb, supra note 265. Others have noted that the aid to Nicaraguan contras was provided 
by a "vast" private network with at least tacit U.S. administration approval. Private Pipeline to the 
Contras, N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1986, at AI, col. 4. 
298 Engelberg, U.S. Officials Said to Have Aided Private Suppliers of Contra Units, N.Y. Times, Oct. 
11,1986, at AI, col. 1. 
299 One of the Congressmen investigating the affair has stated that "Casey's fingerprints are 
everywhere." See, McManus, supra note 256; Kranish, Witness says C.I.A. Got Authorization to Train 
Contras, Boston Globe, Mar. 29, 1987, at A23, col. 1. 
300 Halloran, American is Captured After Plane is Downed in Nicaraguan Territory, N.Y. Times, Oct. 
8, 1986, at AI, col. 1. 
301 Nicaragua Charges Flight Carried Arms, Boston Globe, October 8, 1986, at AI, col. 4. 
302 King, Private Role Increasing in Foreign War Actions, N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1986, at A18, col. 
1. 
303 See supra note 298. 
304 Halloran, Reagan Calls Plane's Crew a New Lincoln Brigade, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1986, at A8, 
col. 1. For a discussion of the establishment by the C.I.A. of a similar air transport company linked 
to the contra resupply effort, see Palmer, Firm With Contra Links Had U.S. Contact, Boston Globe, 
April 5, 1987, at A9, col. 1. 
305 LeMoyne, Nicaragua Shows Reporter Man it Says is Flier, N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1986, at A8, col. 
3; Engleberg, U.S. Says Contras Got More Supplies, N.V. Times, Oct. 12, 1986, at A19, col. 1. See also, 
TOWER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 244, at B125. 
306 LeMoyne, U.S. Prisoner in Nicaragua Says C.I.A. Ran Contra Supply Flights, N.V. Times Oct. 
10, 1986, at AI, col. 2; Captive Cites C.I.A. Role in Rebel Airdrops, Boston Globe, October 10, 1986, 
at AI, col. 3. 
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government to remain silent about it. 307 According to this document, failure to do so 
would "result in prosecution by the United States government."308 
Much of the current controversy surrounding the establishment of the private contra 
aid groups centers on how far up the chain of government the knowledge went. SOg The 
argument is that since the President did not order the covert operations directly, the 
Boland Amendment does not apply. However, this argument fails. The extent and timing 
of the direct knowledge of the President is immaterial because the Boland Amendment 
is only concerned with aid provided by the C.I.A. or the Department of Defense, and 
not the person who authorized the aid. 310 In other words, the knowledge of covert aid 
to the contras during the time in which the Boland Amendment was in effect by even 
one Executive Branch official is sufficient to violate the law. Thus, while it is only alleged 
that the President may have known about the affair from the beginning,3Il the Tower 
Commission found conclusively that other Administration officials did indeed have the 
requisite knowledge concerning the Iran-Contra affair to constitute a violation of the 
Boland Amendment. For example, as previously discussed, it was found that Lt. Col. 
Oliver L. North helped to administer the covert contra aid program and set up Swiss 
bank accounts. 312 In addition, former National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane, Vice 
Admiral John Poindexter, former C.I.A. director William Casey, and Richard V. Secord, 
a retired Air Force M<tior General, were found to have known about the affair from its 
307 The statement contains multiple references to the United States government, including the 
following: 
· .. I further acknowledge and agree that I have a continuing individual respon-
sibility to the United States government for the protection of such information and 
that termination from this relationship with CAS Ltd., and/or the United States gov-
ernment does not release me of my obligations or any other previously executed 
Secrecy Agreements. 
· .. I understand that I will not be relieved of these obligations except when 
specifically advised in writing by the sponsoring activity of the United States govern-
ment. 
· .. I understand that this agreement may be retained by the United States gov-
ernment for its future use in any manner. 
Palmer, Contra Suppliers Signed Secrecy Accord, Boston Globe, Feb. 12,1987, at AI, col. 1. (A copy of 
the document is on file with the THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL). 
308Id. 
30Y TOWER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 244, at CI4, III 24, IV 12-13. See also, Boyd, North 
Falsified Iran Information, White House Says, N.V. Times, Mar. 6, 1987, at AI, col. 6; Gordon, White 
House Knew of a Shift on Iran, C.I.A. Officials Say, N.V. Times, Mar. 20, 1987, at AI, col. 3. 
310 See supra note 264 and accompanying text. 
311 Rosenbaum, A Senator Asserts that Reagan Knew of Arming Contras, N.V. Times, May 4, 1987, 
at AI, col. 6; Pertman, Panelists: Reagan Knew of Aid Effort, Boston Globe, May 4, 1987, at AI, col. 
6. 
The joint Congressional comittee investigating the Iran-contra affair noted that "[tJhe President 
created or at least tolerated an environment where those who knew of the diversion believed with 
absolute certainty that they were carrying out the President's policies." Shenon, supra note 272. 
312 See Engelberg, Contra Aid: Loose Law?, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1987, at A12, col. I; North 
Implicated in Contra Supply Through Portugal, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1987, at AI, col. 6; LeMoyne, 
Contra Chief Says North Arranged Four Payments, N.V. Times, Feb. 21, 1987, at B4, col. 5; Contra Cash 
Linked to North, N.V. Times, Jan. 9, 1987, at A8, col. 4; LeMoyne, Contras Say Cash Came From 
Associate of North, N.V. Times, Jan. 10, 1987, at A5, col. 5; Diamond, Files From Contras' Banks Show 
Payments During Ban, N.V. Times, Mar. 3, 1987, at A9, col. 5; Fritz & McManus, Rudman: Arms Deal 
Funneled Contras Millions, L.A. Times, Mar. 7, 1987, at A I, col. 6. See also supra notes 283-95 and 
accompanying text. 
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inception.313 Furthermore, in a memorandum to the President regarding the covert 
action, Poindexter noted that the C.I.A. was the conduit between the Department of 
Defense and Iran: 
Therefore it is proposed that Israel make the necessary arrangements 
for the sale of 4,000 TOW weapons to Iran. Sufficient funds to cover the 
sale will be transferred to an agent of the C.I.A. 
The C.I.A. will then purchase the weapons from the Department of 
Defense and deliver the weapons to Iran. 314 
In addition to assisting in the flow of arms from the U.S. to Iran, the C.I.A. was 
also actively involved in the Central American portion of the Iran-contra affair. The 
Tower Report noted that Thomas Castillo, the C.I.A. station chief in Costa Rica, was 
instrumental in arranging for military supplies to be dropped to the contras during the 
Boland Amendment ban on such aid. 315 
Thus, through the findings of the Tower Commission and White House documents 
made public in its wake, it is evident that members of both the Central Intelligence 
Agency and the Department of Defense were instrumental in providing funds to the 
Nicaraguan contras in violation of the Boland Amendment. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This note has pointed out the severe inadequacies that exist in current United States 
policy in El Salvador and Nicaragua. Through violations of the War Powers Resolution 
and the Foreign Assistance Act in El Salvador; and the Neutrality Act, the U.S. Consti-
tution, and Boland Amendment in Nicaragua, this note has shown that the United States 
is illegally interfering in the affairs of both of those countries. The violations of the 
statutes discussed in this note are not simply technical matters, nor do they injure only 
the unfortunate citizens of El Salvador and Nicaragua. The sponsoring of the govern-
ment of a foreign country such as El Salvador, or the anti-government "rebels" in a 
country like Nicaragua in violation of domestic U.S. law, undermines the democratic 
decision-making process in general. The War Powers Resolution, the Foreign Assistance 
Act, the Neutrality Act, the Constitution, and the Boland Amendment all reflect the 
same basic premise, that the United States government should support groups with 
questionable goals only after significant and meaningful public discussion and debate, 
and with the agreement of both the President and Congress. Thus, presidential circum-
vention of those laws by allowing illegal intervention in the affairs of El Salvador and 
Nicaragua must not be tolerated by either Congress or the American people. 
The problem presented in this note is a difficult one to solve. The aim of the Central 
American policy of the Reagan Administration is a noble one - to stop the spread of 
313 See Diamond & Blumenthal, Two U.S. Colonels Linked to Efforts to Sell U.S. Arms, N.Y. Times, 
Jan. II, 1987, at AI, col. 6; Boyd, Two Key Documents on Iran Policy Are Made Public by White House, 
N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1987, at AI, col. 4; Texts of Order by Reagan and Memo, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 
1987, at AS, col. I. 
314 Texts of Order by Reagan and Memo, supra note 313, at col. 4. 
315 Rosenbaum, supra note 256, at A6, col. I. 
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communism.316 It is difficult to argue that such a goal should not be a primary thrust of 
U.S. foreign policy.317 However, there must be a solution that stops short of violating 
domestic law.318 In order to acheive that goal, Congress must be given more control over 
the process of providing aid to El Salvador and Nicaragua. Accordingly, two new bipar-
tisan committees should be established, one for El Salvador, and one for Nicaragua. 
The first, called the "Congressional Human Rights Committee", would be assigned 
the task of verifying the requisite human rights advancements in El Salvador under the 
Foreign Assistance Act. By establishing such a committee, the semi-annual certifications 
made by the President would not be made blindly, as is now the case. Furthermore, 
public testimony and debate could be presented and considered before aid to the Sal-
vadoran government would be allowed to continue. In addition, the committee could 
function in a similar way in the evaluation of human rights-contingent laws in other 
countries, thus guaranteeing that United States policy towards human rights violations 
in all countries would be uniform and well-considered. 
The second bipartisan Congressional committee that must be established could be 
called the "Congressional Contra Aid Committee." Hearings before this committee would 
take two forms. First, the committee would require semi-annual testimony from selected 
cabinet members and advisors describing any contra aid given during the previous six 
months, and certifying that it is not illegal. Those required to testify would include the 
President, Secretary of State, White House Chief of Staff, Attorney General, Secretaries 
of the Army and Navy, and the Directors of the CIA and the NSC. Those hearings, 
conducted under oath, would create a permanent record of testimony on which to base 
316 The subject of a Communist threat or lack thereof in Central America is beyond the scope 
of this note. However, it is interesting to note that American Presidents have long considered 
Central America a threat to the United States. In 1927, Calvin Coolidge spoke of what he viewed 
as a communist threat in Nicaragua: 
I have the most conclusive evidence that arms and munitions in large quantities 
... have been shipped to the revolutionists .... The United States cannot fail to view 
with deep concern any serious threat to stability and constitutional government ... 
tending toward anarchy and jeopardizing American interest, especially if such a state 
of affairs is contributed to or brought about by outside influence or by a foreign 
power. 
See O'Malley, Play it Again, in ROSSET & VANDERMEER, supra note 6, at 155. 
317 It is unfortunate that this issue tends to force people to defensively assume a "liberal" or 
"conservative" posture. In order to avoid that definitional conflict, this Note has taken a decidedly 
neutral stand. The point that is being stressed is not whether the United States should become 
involved in Central American politics. Rather, the point here is that the current level of U.S. 
involvement in El Salvador and Nicaragua is illegal, based on violations of domestic law. As such, 
that intervention cannot be tolerated. As the Supreme Court noted in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 
648 (1961), "[n]othing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own 
laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." In addition, as Justice Brandeis, 
dissenting, wrote in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928), [o]ur government is the 
potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the people by its example .... If 
the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for the law; it invites every man to 
become a law unto himself. It invites anarchy." 
318 Edgar Chamorro, the former director of the contra organization known as the Nicaraguan 
Democratic Force, resigned in 1984 in protest of contra atrocities. He has noted that "rather than 
engage itself further, economically or militarily, the best course for the United States is to distance 
itself from the conflict, encourage political dialogue, and support Latin American countries in their 
effort to prevent a regional war." See How the United States Should Handle Nicaragua, in RosSET & 
V ANDERMEER, supra note 7, at 39. 
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further prosecutions relating to, for example, perjury or even impeachment if the 
participants were later shown to have lied about the legality of United States intervention 
in Nicaragua. In addition, the requirement of testimony at regular intervals would force 
government officials to be accountable and responsible to Congress and to the American 
people. The Tower Commission Report leaves the impression that the officials involved in 
the Iran-contra affair felt no such accountability, and it was this lack of restraint that 
contributed to the extent of the affair. 
A second function of the committee would be to conduct hearings on the Neutrality 
Act. It is clear that there is a difference of opinion surrounding the applicability of the 
Act to the actions of the President and the Executive Branch, at least as far as the Reagan 
Administration is concerned. Hearings must be conducted, and testimony given, regard-
ing the redrafting of this law. Congress should reenact the Neutrality Act with more 
precise statutory language. Currently the Neutrality Act drafted in the 1700's and 
buttressed with hundreds of years of presidential, congressional, and judicial interpre-
tation, can only become more ambiguous with time. 
By way of summary, this Note closes with a portion of an 1859 Grand Jury Charge 
by Judge McCale concerning the applicability of the Neutrality Act to one of the United 
States' 1850's excursions into Nicaragua, which is relevant to current U.S. intervention 
in Central America, and the failure of the Administration to take note of domestic law 
restrictions on that intervention. 
We know, gentlemen of the grand jury, that peaceful relations exist 
between this country and Nicaragua .... 
. . . Surely it may be urged as an argument, to show the humanity of the 
law, that its faithful and rigid enforcement, whether by the government or 
the courts, may be instrumental in saving deluded persons from the perils 
into which they would blindly rush under the guidance of their leaders .... 319 
PETER S. MICHAELS 
319 Charge to Grand Jury-Neutrality Laws, 30 F. Cas. 1023, 1024 (CC La., 1859) (No. 18,268). 
